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Regulatory takings law is by most accounts a “muddle.”1
Despite a series of high-profile decisions over the last three
decades, the Supreme Court has failed to solve the riddle it
posed for itself in the seminal case of the modern regulatory
takings era, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York:2 When does a regulation burdening property rise to the
level of a compensable “taking”?3
Although current regulatory takings jurisprudence lacks
theoretical coherence, the elements of the doctrine are easily
enough stated. Regulations that result in permanent physical
occupation4 or deprivation of all economically viable use of
land5 are per se takings—except when they’re not.6 Exactions—
conditioning land development approvals upon the surrender of
a valuable property right—are subject to the Nollan “essential
nexus”7 and Dolan “rough proportionality”8 tests, designed to

1. See John D. Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The Takings Issue and the
Due Process Clause: A Way Out of a Doctrinal Confusion, 17 VT. L. REV. 695,
696 (1993) (labeling takings jurisprudence a “confused body of law”); Carol M.
Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 561, 561–63 (1984) (describing takings law as riddled with “confusion”). But cf. Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory
Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 205–06 (2004) (arguing that the
takings doctrine reasonably accommodates federalism and the limits of the
Court’s institutional role).
2. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
3. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: “[N]or shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
4. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982) (holding that “a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve”).
5. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1004, 1028–31 (1992)
(holding that regulations that “eliminate all economically beneficial use” of
land are per se takings). The Lucas “total taking” test is limited to property in
land. See id. at 1027–28 (distinguishing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66–67
(1979), which upheld a regulation destroying the economic value of personal
property).
6. See id. at 1028–29 (stating that a regulation reflecting a “limitation”
that “inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles
of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership” is noncompensable).
7. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1987) (holding that if permit approval is conditioned on surrender of a property right, the
condition must have an “essential nexus” to the purpose of the regulation).
8. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (holding that the
government “must make some sort of individualized determination that the
required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the
proposed development”).
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prevent “extortion.”9 All other regulatory takings claims are decided under the Penn Central balancing test, requiring a casespecific weighing of the character of the government’s action
against the loss incurred by the property owner, taking into account “distinct investment-backed expectations.”10
Because balancing incommensurables under the Penn Central test is difficult, courts often resorted to a more manageable
short-form alternative set out in Agins v. City of Tiburon, requiring only two threshold determinations: a regulation is a
compensable taking if it “does not substantially advance legitimate state interests . . . or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.” 11 Recently, however, Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc.12 expressly repudiated the Agins “substantially advances” formula, stating that it “prescribes an inquiry in the
nature of a due process, not a takings, test,” was “derived from
due process, not takings, precedents,” and “has no proper place
in our takings jurisprudence.”13
Lingle is an important clarification, pruning errant language in Agins that imported Lochner-style heightened substantive due process14 review into modern takings law. The
Lingle opinion is, moreover, a remarkably candid admission
that the Court had lost its way in the takings thicket. But the
conflation of takings law with substantive due process runs
deeper than Agins,15 and Lingle is an inadequate corrective.
This Article traces the roots of the doctrinal muddle to the
Court’s anachronistic misreading, from Penn Central forward,
9. See id. at 386–91 (quoting with approval the “extortion” language from
Nollan and extending the test for exactions to include “rough proportionality”);
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (stating that if the permit condition does not serve the
same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction
“is not a valid regulation of land use, but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion’”)
(quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14–15 (N.H. 1981))).
10. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978) (identifying as factors of “particular significance” the “economic impact
. . . on the claimant,” the “extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations,” and “the character of the governmental action”).
11. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
12. 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2082 (2005).
13. Id. at 2082–83, 2087.
14. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, inter alia: “[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
15. See Echeverria & Dennis, supra note 1, at 698 (“[A]s takings doctrine
has evolved . . . the distinctive character of the due process and takings inquiries has become obscured.”).
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of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process cases as Fifth Amendment Takings Clause precedents—the same error Lingle discerned in Agins. The most important of these misplaced precedents are Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of
Chicago16 (Chicago B & Q)—said to have incorporated the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause against the states17—and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon18—said to have established that a
regulation that “goes too far” is a compensable Fifth Amendment taking.19 Understood in proper historical context, however, neither Chicago B & Q nor Mahon said anything about
the Fifth Amendment or its Takings Clause, which at the time
applied only to the federal government.20 Both cases were decided on Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
grounds.
Chicago B & Q did hold that due process requires states to
pay “just compensation” when taking property by eminent domain,21 and subsequent Courts noted parallels between that
holding and the Fifth Amendment prohibition on uncompensated “takings.”22 But that did not mean that the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause applied to the states. For nineteenth- and early twentieth-century courts, the Takings Clause
had a straightforward textual basis in an amendment that applied exclusively to the federal government,23 while the just
16. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
17. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 428 U.S. 104, 122
(1978) (citing Chicago B & Q for the proposition that the Takings Clause “is
made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment”).
18. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
19. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 325 (2002) (stating that Mahon “gave birth to our
regulatory takings jurisprudence”).
20. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833) (holding
that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause applies only to the federal government). As Part II.C. shows, Barron remained good law until the 1950s.
21. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 166 U.S. at 236 (“Due process
of law as applied to judicial proceedings instituted for the taking of private
property for public use means . . . such process as recognizes the right of the
owner to be compensated if his property be wrested from him and transferred
to the public.”).
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325
(1893) (stating that in takings claims against the United States “we need not
have recourse to . . . natural equity . . . for, in this Fifth Amendment, there is
stated the exact limitation on the power of the government to take private
property for public uses”).
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compensation principle that Chicago B & Q found in Fourteenth Amendment due process was derived from “universal
law” and “natural equity.”24 Mahon was part of that same century-long line of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process jurisprudence.25
During this period, the due process-based doctrine applicable to states and the Takings Clause applicable to the federal
government were seen as parallel and independent, not identical, doctrines. The major difference reflected a fundamental
point of federalism. State law was understood to be the principal source of property law, defining the nature and limits of the
property rights held by the claimant. In Fifth Amendment takings cases, the federal government had to take state property
law more or less as given, the outcome turning on whether the
federal action so abridged state-recognized property rights as to
constitute a “taking” of property.26
Due process-based claims against states played out differently. Because state law determined the scope of property
rights, a claim that a state had deprived the claimant of property invited the defense that the claimant’s property rights
simply did not extend so far as claimed, so that no property had
been “taken.”27 All states asserted as a foundational element of
their property law that all property was qualified by, and held
subject to, the state’s reserved police power to regulate to protect the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. The
police power thus operated as an inherent limitation on property rights, part of the state-law definition of property itself.
24. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 166 U.S. at 236–37; see also
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) (stating that states must pay
just compensation in eminent domain because that principle is “included in
the conception of due process of law” and “not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments”), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964).
25. See Robert Brauneis, “The Foundation of Our ‘Regulatory Takings’ Jurisprudence”: The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes’s Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613 (1996); William Michael Treanor,
Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J.
813 (1998); see also infra Part II.E.
26. See infra Part II.D.
27. “Taking” was used interchangeably with “deprivation of property” in
both Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process cases in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, contributing to the modern confusion. See, e.g., Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 330 (1932) (holding federal estate tax provision “so arbitrary and capricious as to cause it to fall within the
ban of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment”). Nothing turns on this
shorthand use of the term.
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Because all property was subject to this indefinite limitation,
property rights were also indefinite at the boundaries, and varied over time and across jurisdictions.
Regulatory takings claims against states under the Due
Process Clause turned centrally on whether the challenged
regulation fell within the legitimate bounds of the police
power.28 If the action was a valid police power exercise, that
was dispositive: no deprivation of property had occurred. Because there was no federal analog to the states’ police power,
these arguments had no place in Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause doctrine.29 Genetically, analytically, and operationally,
the two doctrines were distinct.
Penn Central changed all that, holding that the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause applies directly to the states, citing a single precedent, Chicago B & Q, which in fact said no
such thing. From there, the Penn Central Court attempted to
weave a unified takings doctrine out of a pastiche of Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process and Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause precedents. The ensuing doctrinal merger effectively eliminated Fourteenth Amendment due process as a distinctive category of inquiry in takings law and eviscerated the
states’ police power defense. Elimination of that defense, in
turn, diminished the role of state property law in defining the
content and limits of property entitlements against which a
“taking” would be measured, and sowed confusion as to what
counts as “property” for purposes of takings analysis.30 With
state law deprived of its historic role, we are left with no principled way to determine the baseline of property rights to which
a claimant is legitimately entitled.31
28. See infra Part II.A.
29. The federal government has general police power over the District of
Columbia and federal territories. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156
(1921) (upholding wartime rent controls in the District of Columbia as a legitimate police power measure). Congress’s plenary power over public lands is
also “analogous to” the states’ police power. Camfield v. United States, 167
U.S. 518, 525–26 (1897).
30. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A
Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301,
318–20 (1993) (arguing that in recent takings cases it is not clear whether the
Supreme Court is relying on a “legal-positivist” conception of property, general
federal common law, or on a constitutional definition of property grounded in
natural law).
31. See id. at 327 (warning that contemporary takings law threatens to
make “the Federal Constitution, specifically the Taking[s] Clause, dictate to
the States the jurisprudential spirit in which their general laws of property
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Conflation of the two doctrines also introduced confusion
about what counts as precedent in takings adjudication, and
led to “reverse incorporation” of substantive due process concepts and principles into Fifth Amendment takings law—the
problem that Lingle discerned in Agins, but that pervades contemporary takings jurisprudence.32
The conundrum is of the Court’s own making. Its solution
does not lie in further judicial parsing of the verb “to take” or
its derivative noun form “taking,”33 nor does it lie in metaphysical inquiry into the essential attributes of property in
general. Instead, the solution must come from an inquiry into
the nature and limits of private property rights in a democratic
society, and the nature and limits of the states’ concomitant
power, on behalf of the demos, to define and adjust the legal
boundaries determining the specific content of those rights.
That discussion, predicated upon the understanding that the
law of property—like any foundational social institution—must
be dynamic and malleable to adapt to changing social needs, is
one in which substantive-due-process-era courts and commentators constructively engaged through their discourse on the
police power and its limits. It is a discourse that in the postPenn Central era we have abandoned, to the impoverishment of
property jurisprudence.
This Article is structured as follows: Part I offers a general
introduction to the federalism principles that historically undergirded our constitutional law of property. Part II introduces
the police power and its historic role as an inherent limitation
on property rights, describes the distinguishing characteristics
of the due process and Takings Clause branches of just compensation law, and places Chicago B & Q and Mahon in proper
historical context as substantive due process, not Takings
Clause, cases. Part III discusses how Penn Central misconstrued Chicago B & Q ’s due process holding as a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause precedent, and suggests that the rising
tide of selective incorporation rhetoric in the years before Penn
Central may have contributed to the confusion. Part III also
unpacks the elements of the doctrinal muddle that followed

and nuisance are to be read and construed, whether contained in legislative
enactments or judicial decisions”).
32. See infra Part III.C.
33. See Rose, supra note 1, at 562 (describing takings law as an effort to
plumb the “elusive[ ] . . . meaning of ‘taking’ in our law”).
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conflation of substantive due process and the Takings Clause.
Part IV discusses the rise and fall of the police power, and the
conceptual gap its demise has left in our constitutional law of
property. Part V concludes with a proposal to rehistoricize
property jurisprudence by restoring the police power to its
rightful place as a “background principle” of state property law.
I. PROPERTY FEDERALISM
In our post-Erie v. Tompkins34 world, the ordinary legal
presumption is that property law—like the law of tort and contract—is principally a matter of state law.35 Indeed, even in the
Swift v. Tyson36 era of general federal common law, courts routinely invoked state law rather than general federal common
law to determine the extent of claimants’ property rights in
federal constitutional adjudication.37 As the Supreme Court explained in 1907 in Sauer v. City of New York, “this court has
neither the right nor the duty . . . to reduce the [property] law
of the various States to a uniform rule which it shall announce
and impose.”38 This basic federalism principle followed from
Swift itself, which said that “local law” should govern matters
of a “strictly local” nature, including “rights and titles to things
having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to
real estate,” while “questions of a more general nature” like

34. 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938). The Court held that a federal court in diversity jurisdiction should apply state law and not general federal common
law. Id. at 78.
35. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86
VA. L. REV. 885, 943–44 & n.224 (2000) (tracing the roots of “the understanding that property is a positive right largely (if not exclusively) defined by state
law”).
36. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842) (holding that section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, providing that state laws “shall be regarded as rules of decision” in federal courts, did not apply to commercial law or other “questions of a
more general nature”), overruled by Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
37. See Merrill, supra note 35, at 943–44 n.224 and cases cited therein.
E.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 175 U.S. 91,
100–01 (1899) (holding that a dispute concerning damage to property from
railroad operations is to be decided by state law and not general federal common law); Smith Middlings Purifier Co. v. McGroarty, 136 U.S. 237, 241
(1890) (holding that a diversity case concerning mortgage rights is to be decided by Ohio state law).
38. 206 U.S. 536, 548 (1907) (rejecting a due process property deprivation
claim because “under the law of New York, as determined by its highest court,
the plaintiff never owned the easements which he claimed, and . . . therefore
there was no property taken”).
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contract interpretation and commercial law were subject to
“general law.”39
For most purposes we still adhere to the view that state
law, not federal law, is the primary source and determinant of
the scope and limits of property, and that view is only
strengthened by the Erie doctrine. Bolstering this understanding is the Positivist- and Realist-inspired insight that property
law, and a fortiori the scope of property entitlements, are
grounded in neither universal principles of natural right40 nor
timeless common law precepts,41 but instead grew out of judgemade common law as modified by subsequent case law and legislative enactments.42 An owner’s property rights thus ordinarily extend only as far as state property law says they do, and
under federalism principles, states have considerable discretion
not only to determine the primary rules of property in the first
instance, but also to make necessary adjustments over time
through legislative enactments and evolving judicial doctrines,
just as they adjust their laws of tort or contract.43
39. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18–19.
40. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Private Land Made (Too) Simple, 33 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,155, 10,160 (2003) (stating that “natural-rights justifications” for
property law “were wisely cast aside . . . and do not withstand scrutiny today”); Michelman, supra note 30, at 305 (“By an argument that reaches back
at least to Bentham, property’s scope and content—property’s existence,
even—are completely dependent upon standing law. . . . [Consequently,] the
term ‘property’ in the Fourteenth Amendment denotes nothing except what
some corpus of extant positive law happens to make into property.”). For a
contrary view, see Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property
Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549 (2003) (attempting to derive a theory of
property from universal principles of natural right).
41. See Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1295, 1295 (1998) (“The legal realists of the 1920s and ‘30s demonstrated that
all law is ‘public’—that is, dependent upon the state.”); Joseph William Singer,
Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 491 (1988) (“The realists argued that
the concept of private property . . . encompassed competing values and principles. . . . [Courts] therefore could not deduce specific legal rules from the abstract concept of property.”).
42. See, e.g., Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due
Process, Regulatory Takings, and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379,
402–04 (2001) (describing property as the product of dynamic interplay between common law and legislation).
43. See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433,
1446 (1993) (“Historically, property definitions have continuously adjusted to
reflect new economic and social structures, often to the disadvantage of existing owners.”); id. at 1448 (citing major changes in property including abolition
of feudal tenures and entails; changes in dower and curtesy; abolition of ripar-
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With that background understanding, we should expect
property rights in our federal system to be both dynamic and
divergent, as state legislatures and courts create new property
rules or extend, trim, or modify old ones. Thus property law in
Louisiana, rooted in French and Spanish civil law traditions,44
differs from property law in New York, which grafted English
common law onto an earlier Dutch legal system45 and was later
modified by legislatures and judges.46 Property law in Virginia
also diverges from New York’s, having developed on a unique
evolutionary trajectory.47
On this federalist understanding, we might further expect
that federal constitutional property guarantees like the Due
Process and Takings Clauses must take state property law
more or less as given. As the Supreme Court said in a leading
procedural due process case: “Property interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law . . . .”48
This division of legal labor is foundational to the architecture of
our federalist system.
Curiously, however, despite property federalism’s prominence elsewhere,49 it often gets short shrift in contemporary
ian water rights in the West; and the rise of married women’s property rights).
44. See, e.g., Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452, 463 (1896) (holding that
construction of a levee on private waterfront land did not deprive owner of
property because under Louisiana law derived from the Code Napoleon, lands
abutting waterways are subject to a public servitude for levees).
45. See Joseph A. Ranney, Anglicans, Merchants, and Feminists: A Comparative Study of the Evolution of Married Women’s Rights in Virginia, New
York, and Wisconsin, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 493, 503 (2000) (stating
that early New York property law retained important strains of a community
property system derived from Dutch law, later supplanted by English law).
46. See id. at 506–12 (tracing expansion of married women’s property
rights in New York through legislation, constitutional amendments, and case
law).
47. See id. at 516–25 (describing divergent paths of New York and Virginia in recognizing married women’s property rights).
48. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see also Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155 (1944) (“The great body of law in this
country which controls acquisition, transmission, and transfer of property, and
defines the rights of its owners in relation to the state or to private parties, is
found in the statutes and decisions of the state.”).
49. See Michelman, supra note 30, at 321 (describing the apparent “deviation” of some of the Court’s takings rhetoric from its “standard legal-positivist
mantra” that property rights are not created by the Constitution but by state
law); see also, e.g., Am. Mfr. Mut. Ins. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 60–61 (1999)
(rejecting procedural due process claim because plaintiff had no property in-

KARKKAINEN_3FMT

836

04/20/2006 10:15:59 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:826

takings cases.50 The Court faithfully recites that there is no
federal constitutional definition of property, but seldom relies
upon state law to inform its inquiry into the existence, nature,
and limits of the property entitlement allegedly taken.51 Indeed, on at least one occasion the Court expressly repudiated a
takings claim based on the idiosyncrasies of state property law,
dismissing such arguments as mere “legalistic distinctions.”52
More recently, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Court straightjacketed states’ latitude to redefine property rights, rejecting
Rhode Island’s argument that its authority to “shape and define property rights” through regulation necessarily must inform what counts as a “reasonable investment-backed expectation” so that (on the state’s theory) if the challenged regulation
was already in effect when the property was acquired, a takings claim should not be available.53
In principle, the state’s law of property ought to matter for
purposes of regulatory takings analysis. If what counts as
“property” is determined by state law, then a claim that property was “taken” by government action should depend in part
on the logically antecedent inquiry whether the claimant’s
property rights under state law actually extend as far as the
claimant alleges—that is, whether a constitutionally protectable property interest is implicated.54
terest under state law); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
538 (1985) (“Respondents’ federal constitutional claim depends on their having
had a property right [under state law].”).
50. See Michelman, supra note 30, at 303 (describing a “bad fit” between
the “market conservative” project of contemporary regulatory takings doctrine
and the “legal conservative” project of federalism which recognizes property
rights are principally defined by state law). But cf. Sterk, supra note 1 (arguing that modern takings doctrine accommodates federalism).
51. But cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984)
(holding that the Takings Clause protects health, safety, and environmental
data recognized as a “trade-secret property right” under state law).
52. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
500 (1987) (stating that although Pennsylvania law recognizes the “support
estate” as a separate interest in land, “our takings jurisprudence forecloses
reliance on such legalistic distinctions”); id. at 518–20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (chiding the Court for failing to credit state law in determining claimants’
property rights). Keystone Bituminous upheld a statute requiring coal operators to provide subjacent support to surface property. Id. at 506. Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon relied upon the same “legalistic distinction” to hold a similar statute invalid. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (stating that the statute “purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as
an estate in land”).
53. 533 U.S. 606, 626–27 (2001).
54. Cf. Eric T. Freyfogle, Regulatory Takings, Methodically, 31 ENVTL. L.

KARKKAINEN_3FMT

2006]

04/20/2006 10:15:59 AM

THE POLICE POWER REVISITED

837

The Court seemed to acknowledge as much in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council55 when it stated that property
rights may be subject to “limitations” that “inhere in the title
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the
State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership.”56 But having gotten that far, the Lucas Court lost
its conceptual grip. What are these “inherent limitations” in
“background principles of the state’s law of property”? Without
explicitly so holding, Lucas strongly implied that “inherent
limitations” are confined to longstanding general common law
principles of private and public nuisance.57 But why should
that be? After all, the common law no longer holds a privileged
place in our legal order; in most circumstances it can be
trumped by ordinary legislative enactments.58 There is no obvious reason why property law should be any different in that regard.59
Lucas warned that legislative enactments cannot themselves become instant “background principles” at their enactment.60 That seems reasonable enough. Perhaps new law
REP. 10,313, 10,314 (2001) (“A court in a takings case faces two, sequential
questions. First, what are the plaintiff ’s property rights, under the various
valid laws . . . [and second] has that property been taken?”); Sterk, supra note
1, at 222 (“[W]ithin our federal system, definition of property rights has generally been left to the states, [and] if state law did not create property in the
first instance, then subsequent state action cannot take property.”).
55. 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
56. Id.
57. Id. (stating that regulation denying economically viable use of land
must “do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in
the courts . . . under the State’s law of private nuisance, or by the State under
its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally,
or otherwise”); id. n.16 (“The principal ‘otherwise’ that we have in mind is litigation absolving the State (or private parties) of liability for the destruction of
‘real and personal property . . . to prevent . . . fire’ or to forestall other grave
threats to the lives and property of others.”).
58. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2107 (2002) (describing the “accepted hierarchy” that “the Constitution always trumps statutes, but statutes always trump
the common law”); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
873, 904 (1987) (“The common law is not prepolitical. . . . [E]fforts to change
the common law framework are not by virtue of the fact constitutionally suspect . . . .”).
59. See Freyfogle, supra note 54, at 10,314 (arguing that takings analysis
must consider the “rights crafted by the interaction” of “all laws, in all forms,
from all levels of government,” which determine “what the law generally, and
hence the Constitution, deems property”).
60. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (stating that “confiscatory” regulations
“cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation)” but “must in-
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should never pass instantly into background. It is more difficult, however, to see why legislative enactments might not become “background principles” with the passage of time—a possibility the Court came close to ruling out in Palazzolo.61
Moreover, despite the Lucas Court’s rhetorical nod to the
role of background principles of state law, the Lucas opinion
trod perilously close to imposing a general federal common law
baseline definition of property for purposes of takings analysis,
pontificating at length on the generalities of public and private
nuisance doctrine without tethering that discussion to South
Carolina statutes, common law, or case law.62
II. THE POLICE POWER IN SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE
A. THE POLICE POWER AS “BACKGROUND PRINCIPLE” AND
“INHERENT LIMITATION”
Suppose a state were to claim that its longstanding “background principles of property law” include the following: “All
property is held subject to, and inherently limited by, the
state’s reserved power to enact regulations to protect the
health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its citizens.”
here in the title itself ” through “background principles” and “do no more than
duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts” under private
or public nuisance or “otherwise”).
61. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (holding that
“[f]uture generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations
on the use and value of land” even if those restrictions pre-date their acquisition of the property). This was the dispute between Justices O’Connor and
Scalia in their dueling concurrences in Palazzolo. Justice O’Connor emphasized that the existence of a regulation at the time property is acquired might
serve as one factor in determining the landowner’s “reasonable investmentbacked expectations” under a Penn Central analysis. See id. at 633–36
(O’Connor, J., concurring). In Justice Scalia’s view, the fact that a regulation
existed at the time of acquisition “should have no bearing” on whether it constitutes a taking. See id. at 636–37 (Scalia, J., concurring). Since that principle
would apply to each successive owner in a potentially infinite chain, it is difficult to see how a legislative enactment could ever pass into “background principle.”
62. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030–31 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts
for relevant common law nuisance principles before conceding that the “question . . . is one of state law to be dealt with on remand”); see also Michelman,
supra note 30, at 319 (stating that Justice Scalia wrote parts of Lucas “as if
there is just one American background law of property and nuisance—
supportive, as it happens, of Lucas’ claim—that is common to the national jurisdiction and all the state jurisdictions”).
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Thus, the state might argue, whenever a new regulation
falling within the scope of this reserved power is enacted, it is
not the new regulation that becomes a “background principle.”
Instead, the relevant background principle is that property is
held, and always has been held, subject to the state’s reserved
power to make certain kinds of regulatory adjustments over
time, as the need arises; and that limitation “inheres in the title” to all property. Under that background principle, a subsequent regulatory enactment falling within the scope of the
state’s reserved power could never result in a compensable
“taking” or deprivation of property, for the scope of the claimant’s property entitlement itself is—and always has been—
limited by the possibility that a regulation of that kind might
be enacted.
Such a broad and open-ended assertion of “inherent limitation” on property rights might sound odd, even radical, after
three decades of post-Penn Central regulatory takings jurisprudence, especially in light of Lucas’s crabbed interpretation
of “background principles” and “inherent limitations.”63 But it
would not have sounded odd to nineteenth- and early twentieth-century courts and legislatures,64 for this is precisely the
claim that all states historically made in the name of the “police power”—the states’ reserved power to regulate to protect
the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.65 As
63. See James Burling, The Latest Take on Background Principles and the
States’ Law of Property After Lucas and Palazzolo, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 497,
499 (2002) (“[T]he notion that a government can avoid the reach of the Takings and Just Compensation clauses by merely invoking a harm-preventing
police power rationale were [sic] put to rest in Lucas.”).
64. Two mid-twentieth century commentators stated the thesis concisely:
Property values are enjoyed under an implied limitation imposed by
the police power. This implied limitation reduces the aggregate of
property rights which the landowner can assert against the government, and only those remaining constitute the “legally protected interests” which are his property as against the government. Accordingly, the assertion by the government of any of its powers within the
area of this implied limitation is not a taking of property without
compensation in derogation of the Fourteenth Amendment because
property as against the government is not thereby affected.
Robert Kratovil & Frank J. Harrison, Jr., Eminent Domain—Policy and Concept, 42 CAL. L. REV. 596, 610–11 (1954) (quotations omitted).
65. See, e.g., Fed. Land Bank of New Orleans v. John D. Nix, Jr., Enters.,
117 So. 720, 723 (La. 1928) (“Every one holds his property, under the Constitution, subject to a legitimate exercise of the police power.”); Appeal of White,
134 A. 409, 411 (Pa. 1926) (“No matter how seemingly complete our scheme of
private ownership may be under our system of government, all property is
held in subordination to the right of its reasonable regulation by the govern-
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Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explained in an early and influential case, Commonwealth v. Alger:
We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute
and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability
that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to
the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment
of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. All
property in this commonwealth . . . is . . . held subject to those general
regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general
welfare.66

As a corollary, it followed that the exact scope, content, and
limits of a property owner’s rights could never be fully and precisely delineated, because they remained subject to the state’s
reserved power to adjust their outer boundaries through police
power enactments.
Adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments did not alter
this background understanding of the inherent limits and mutability of property rights. The Supreme Court explained in
Barbier v. Connolly:
[N]either the [Fourteenth] amendment—broad and comprehensive as
it is—nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with the
power of the State, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good
order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of
the State, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity.67

ment clearly necessary to preserve the health, safety, or morals of the people.”); Schiller Piano Co. v. Ill. N. Utils. Co., 123 N.E. 631, 632 (Ill. 1919) (“All
property in a state is held on the implied condition or obligation that the
owner will so use it as not to interfere with the rights of others and subject to
such reasonable regulations as the Legislature may impose [under the police
power].”); Schmitt v. F.W. Cook Brewing Co., 120 N.E. 19, 21 (Ind. 1918)
(“[T]here can be no property rights which are not subject to this [police]
power.”); Ex parte Kelso, 82 P. 241, 242 (Cal. 1905) (“[T]he property owner . . .
holds his property subject to the proper exercise of the police power . . . .”); Eichenlaub v. City of St. Joseph, 21 S.W. 8, 10 (Mo. 1893) (“[E]very citizen holds
his property subject to [the police] powers. [S]uch . . . regulations . . . do not
amount to the taking of private property . . . .”); People v. Gillson, 17 N.E. 343,
345 (N.Y. 1888) (“[A]ll property is held subject to the general police power of
the state to so regulate and control its use, in a proper case, as to secure the
general safety and the public welfare.”); Pool v. Trexler, 76 N.C. 297, 297 (N.C.
1877) (“Every citizen holds his land subservient to such ‘police regulations’ as
the General Assembly may in its wisdom enact . . . .”).
66. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84–85 (1851).
67. 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884).
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If an action fell outside the legitimate bounds of the state’s
police power, however, it implicated due process. The Court
stated in Mugler v. Kansas:
Nor can [police power] legislation . . . come within the Fourteenth
Amendment, in any case, unless it is apparent that its real object is
not to protect the community, or to promote the general well-being,
but, under the guise of police regulation, to deprive the owner of his
liberty and property, without due process of law. The power which the
States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as
will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is not—and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be—burdened with the condition that the State
must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they
may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use
of their property, to inflict injury upon the community.68

Thus a legitimate exercise of the police power could never
give rise to a compensable taking,69 but that did not mean that
states had license to run roughshod over property rights. Some
actions ostensibly taken pursuant to the police power might not
be legitimate exercises of that power. Such actions might be
deemed implied exercises of the state’s complementary power of
eminent domain, compensable under established due process
principles;70 or they might lie beyond any legitimate power of
the state, and be held invalid.71
Under substantive due process review, then, the first and
most important question for a court adjudicating a claim of un68. 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887).
69. See Chi. & Alton R.R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 78 (1915) (“[I]t is
well settled that the enforcement of uncompensated obedience to a legitimate
regulation established under the police power is not a taking of property without compensation, or without due process of law, in the sense of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
70. See, e.g., City of Belleville v. St. Clair Co. Tpk. County, 84 N.E. 1049,
1053 (Ill. 1908) (stating that a use restriction to prevent harm or advance the
general welfare is “a regulation and not a taking, an exercise of the police
power and not of eminent domain” but “the moment the Legislature passes
beyond mere regulation, and attempts to deprive the individual of his property, or of some substantial interest therein, under the pretense of regulation,
then the act becomes one of eminent domain”).
71. The Takings Clause contains an express “public use” limitation, and
states were similarly bound by Fourteenth Amendment due process. See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment due process requires that a state “taking” be for “public
use”). Regulations falling outside the police power and failing the “public use”
test were void. See, e.g., Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 403 (1896)
(Missouri Pac. I ) (invalidating an order authorizing private grain elevator on
railroad right-of-way as a “taking” of private property for private use, violating
due process).

KARKKAINEN_3FMT

842

04/20/2006 10:15:59 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:826

constitutional deprivation of property by a state was: “Is this
action a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power?” An affirmative answer precluded a judgment that compensation was
due, for it meant there had been no interference with the
claimant’s property rights.
Federal regulations affecting property were subject to a
very different analysis. Under most circumstances, the federal
government does not have power to determine in the first instance what is, and what is not, “property.” That, the Court insisted, is a matter of state law.72 Nor does the federal government possess a general police power to regulate property in the
interest of harm-prevention or promotion of the general welfare.73 Unlike the states’ police power, federal powers did not
generally operate as an inherent limitation on property, nor
was the inquiry into the validity of the assertion of federal
power logically antecedent to, or dispositive of, the determination of the scope of claimant’s property rights. Instead, all federal powers were said to be held “subject to” the constraints of

72. See, e.g., Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 41–
42 (1944) (finding that the rights of a mortgagee are a matter of state law and
because state courts concluded that appellants “have never possessed under
New York law such a property right as they claim has been taken from them[,]
. . . appellants have no question for us under the Due Process Clause”); Fox
River Paper Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 274 U.S. 651, 655 (1927) (holding that the
rights of riparian landowners to river beds and use of navigable waterways is
a matter of state property law “to be determined by the statutes and judicial
decisions of the state”); Waggoner Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U.S. 113, 117
(1927) (stating that whether property is classified as realty or personalty “is a
question of local law upon which the local decisions and statutes control”);
Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trs. v. Martin, 268 U.S. 458, 463 (1925) (finding
that federal courts will follow decisions of state courts in interpreting state
statutes or property rules affecting title to real estate); Sauer v. City of New
York, 206 U.S. 536, 548 (1907) (holding that the existence and scope of easements are matters of state property law, and “this court has neither the right
nor the duty . . . to reduce the law of the various States to a uniform rule”).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (invalidating the federal Violence Against Women Act, and stating that “we can
think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the
National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime”); Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156
(1919) (“That the United States lacks the police power, and that this was reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment, is true.”); Brown v. Maryland,
12 Wheat. 419, 443 (1827) (stating that the police power “unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with the States”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 405 (1819) (“Th[e] [federal] government is acknowledged by all, to
be one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it . . . is now universally admitted.”).
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the Fifth Amendment.74 Thus, in a Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause case, the court had to look first to state law to define the
relevant property rights, and then determine whether the challenged federal action so truncated those state-defined property
rights that it would constitute a compensable “taking” of claimant’s property.75 The federalist division of labor in the realm of
property law, then, implied that different standards and modes
of analysis would be used to determine whether a compensable
“taking” or “deprivation” of property had occurred.
Courts continued to recognize this underlying federalist
dualism in property law through all of the late nineteenth and
most of the twentieth centuries in such celebrated cases as Chicago B & Q,76 Reinman v. City of Little Rock,77 Hadacheck v.
Sebastian,78 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,79 Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,80 Miller v. Schoene,81 and Gold74. See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555,
589 & n.19 (1935) (“The bankruptcy power, like the other great substantive
powers of Congress, is subject to the Fifth Amendment.”); Monogahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 336 (1893) (“[L]ike the other powers
granted to the Congress by the Constitution, the power to regulate commerce
is subject to all the limitations imposed by such instrument, and among them
is that of the Fifth Amendment . . . . If, in exercising that supreme control, it
deems it necessary to take private property, then it . . . can take only on payment of just compensation.”).
75. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank, 295 U.S. at 590 (“In order to
determine whether [property rights] have been taken, we must ascertain what
[the plaintiff ’s] rights were before the passage of the Act. [For that, we] turn
. . . first to the law of the State.”); see also United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley
Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 279 (1943) (“Though the meaning of ‘property’ as used in . . . the Fifth Amendment is a federal question, it will normally
obtain its content by reference to local law.”).
76. 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897) (holding that due process requires payment
of just compensation in eminent domain); id. at 252 (holding safety measures
not compensable because “[t]he requirement that compensation be made for
private property taken for public use imposes no restriction upon the inherent
power of the state by reasonable regulations to protect the lives and secure the
safety of the people”).
77. 237 U.S. 171, 176–77 (1915) (upholding an ordinance restricting the
location of livery stables as a legitimate police power exercise compatible with
due process).
78. 239 U.S. 394, 410–11 (1915) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting brick
making in designated zones as a valid police power regulation).
79. 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (invalidating a statute requiring mine operators to provide subjacent support to surface owners because it “cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police power”).
80. 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (upholding a zoning ordinance as a valid police power regulation).
81. 276 U.S. 272, 279–80 (1928) (upholding a statute providing for destruction of infected trees as a valid police power measure).
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blatt v. Hempstead.82 Indeed, it remained a foundational element in constitutional takings jurisprudence right up until the
Supreme Court’s crucial 1978 decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,83 which retroactively rewrote
a century of jurisprudential history.
B. CHICAGO B & Q IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
It is now widely assumed that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause was incorporated against the states in 1897 in Chicago B & Q.84 Challenging conventional wisdom, this Part argues that it was not until 1978 in Penn Central Transportation
Co v. New York85 that the Supreme Court first explicitly held
the Takings Clause applicable to the states. Penn Central
treated the incorporation question as so obviously settled that
it did not merit discussion or analysis, offhandedly stating the
question before the Court to be “whether the restrictions imposed by New York City’s law . . . effect a ‘taking’ of appellants’
property for a public use within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment, which of course is made applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment.”86 The Court cited a single
precedent for that holding: Chicago B & Q.87
In fact, Chicago B & Q had nowhere mentioned the Fifth
Amendment or its Takings Clause.88 Instead, Chicago B & Q
was argued and decided on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds.89
82. 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting sand
and gravel mining below the water table as “a valid police [power] regulation”
and not a due process violation).
83. 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (upholding New York City’s landmarks ordinance against what it deemed a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim).
84. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383 (1994) (citing Chicago B & Q for the proposition that “[t]he Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment . . . [was] made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
85. 438 U.S. 104.
86. Id. at 122 (emphasis added).
87. Id.
88. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that Chicago B & Q “contains no mention of either the Takings Clause or the Fifth
Amendment”).
89. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 235 (1897) (stating the question before the Court as “whether the due
process of law enjoined by the fourteenth amendment requires compensation
to be made . . . to the owner of private property taken for public use under authority of a State”); see also Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern
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Prior to the Reconstruction Amendments, the Takings
Clause—like the rest of the Bill of Rights—had been held to
apply only to the federal government, and not to the states.90
Indeed, the Takings Clause was probably originally understood
as a federalism amendment, to safeguard against overreaching
by a distant central government that might be tempted to seize
land and slaves from wealthy Southern planters91 or to conscript military supplies in the high-handed manner of its imperial predecessor, the English crown.92 This account accords
with legislative history: the Bill of Rights emerged during the
ratification debates in response to Anti-Federalist anxieties
about concentrated, centralized power.93
Unlike the First Amendment,94 however, the Fifth is not
textually limited to the federal government,95 leaving its scope
of application initially uncertain. That issue was squarely resolved in Barron v. Baltimore when the Supreme Court dismissed a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim against the
mayor and city council of Baltimore, reasoning that because the
Takings Clause was added to the Constitution in response to
American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 560–61 n.167 (1995)
(stating that Chicago B & Q did not rely on incorporation but instead “characterizes the right not to be deprived of property for public use without just compensation as inhering in the concept of due process,” based on “principles of
republican institutions, the common law, natural equity, universal law as well
as case law, and treatises relying on these sources”).
90. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 79 (1998).
91. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 837–39 (1995)
(arguing that Madison favored a Takings Clause to protect against seizures of
land and chattels, including slaves); id. at 850–53 (stating that Madison regarded land and slaves as the property most vulnerable to majoritarian overreaching).
92. See AMAR, supra note 90, at 79–80 (stating that the Takings Clause
was intended to safeguard states and their citizens against “impressment” of
property for military use); Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties
and Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL. L. REV. 267, 292 (1988) (arguing the
Takings Clause was intended to keep a remote central government from aggrandizing itself by confiscating property).
93. See Akhil Reed Amar, 2000 Daniel J. Meador Lecture: Hugo Black and
the Hall of Fame, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1221, 1223–24 (2002) (describing the Bill of
Rights as a response to “anxieties of Anti-Federalists” in “the shadow of a
Revolutionary War waged by local governments against an imperial center”).
94. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
95. “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.” U.S. CONST., amend. V.
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fears of abuse by the federal government, it should not be construed to reach the states.96
Barron later came to stand for the proposition that the entire Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government.97 Its
core holding, however—the only legal issue strictly necessary to
its outcome—was that the Takings Clause did not apply to
states or their political subdivisions.98
That understanding persisted after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the 1871 case Pumpelly v. Green Bay
Co.,99 the Court noted that the federal Takings Clause does not
apply to the states,100 and instead applied a similar “takings”
provision in the Wisconsin constitution, emphasizing its duty to
defer to Wisconsin Supreme Court interpretations of that provision.101 In Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co. v.
Alabama, the Court again cited Barron for the proposition that
the Fifth Amendment “only applies a limit to Federal authority,
not restricting the powers of the State,” and elected to construe
the railroad’s challenge to allegedly confiscatory state regulations as stating a Fourteenth Amendment due process and not
a Fifth Amendment takings claim.102
That understanding was reaffirmed in Fallbrook Irrigation
District v. Bradley,103 decided just a few months before Chicago
96. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833).
97. See, e.g., Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 166 (1887) (“[T]he first 10 Articles of Amendment were not intended to limit the powers of the state governments in respect to their own people, but to operate on the National Government alone.” (citing Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 247)).
98. Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 250–51 (“[T]he provision in the fifth
amendment to the constitution, declaring that private property shall not be
taken for public use, without just compensation, is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is
not applicable to the legislation of the states.”).
99. 80 U.S. 166 (13 Wall.) (1871) (holding that a statutorily authorized
mill dam flooding plaintiff ’s land was a compensable taking under the Wisconsin constitution).
100. Id. at 176–77 (“[T]hough the Constitution of the United States provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, it is well settled that this is a limitation on the power of the Federal
government, and not on the States.”).
101. Id. at 180 (“As it is the constitution of that State that we are called on
to construe, these decisions of her Supreme Court, that overflowing land by
means of a dam across a stream is taking private property, within the meaning of that instrument, are of special weight if not conclusive on us.”).
102. 128 U.S. 96, 101 (1888) (citing Barron, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 243).
103. 164 U.S. 112 (1896). Fallbrook was decided on November 16, 1896,
three and one-half months before the Chicago B & Q decision on March 1,
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B & Q. Bradley, a California rancher, claimed that an irrigation district assessment had improperly taken her property, not
for a “public use” but for the private benefit of other ranchers.104 Fallbrook held that “[t]he Fifth Amendment, which provides, among other things, that . . . property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation, applies only to the
Federal government . . . .”105 The Court added, however, that
Fourteenth Amendment due process placed states under a
similar constraint.106 Finding that irrigation could be a valid
“public use” in an arid state like California, the Court affirmed
the validity of the assessment on due process grounds.107
The language and structure of the Fallbrook opinion make
it clear that the Court regarded the Fifth Amendment “public
use” and the Fourteenth Amendment due process-based “public
use” requirements as independent and parallel, not interdependent or identical requirements. Fallbrook not only reaffirmed Barron in unambiguous terms, but it also intimated
that the precise contours of “public use” varied from state to
state,108 suggesting that the due process-based “public use”
limitation had to embrace federalism principles—the Court
would not impose identical constraints everywhere, nor would
it equate the state and federal “public use” requirements.
Thus matters stood when the Court decided Chicago
B & Q. The issue before the Chicago B & Q Court was whether
Fourteenth Amendment due process was satisfied when a jury
awarded one dollar in compensation for an easement the city
had taken by eminent domain for a street crossing over the
railroad’s right-of-way.109 The Court said that “[i]n determining
1897.
104. See id. at 156.
105. Id. at 158.
106. Id. (stating that as a matter of due process “the question whether private property has been taken for any other than a public use becomes material
in this court, even where the taking is under the authority of the State instead
of the Federal Government”).
107. Id. at 164.
108. Id. at 159–60 (stating that “what is a public use frequently and largely
depends upon the facts and circumstances,” and although “the irrigation of
lands in States where there is no color of necessity therefor” might not be
valid, “in a State like California, which confessedly embraces millions of acres
of arid lands, an act of the legislature providing for their irrigation might well
be regarded as an act devoting the water to a public use, and therefore as a
valid exercise of the legislative power”).
109. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
230, 232 (1896).
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what is due process of law regard must be had to substance, not
to form.”110 In eminent domain cases, the Court held, “[d]ue
process of law . . . means such process as recognizes the right of
the owner to be compensated if his property be wrested from
him and transferred to the public.”111 The Court nonetheless
upheld the compensation award, reasoning that the trial court
had properly instructed the jury to base compensation on the
reduction in fair market value of the railroad’s property, and
the Court would not disturb the jury’s factual finding that the
actual loss was trivial.112
The Chicago B & Q opinion cited no controlling precedent
holding that Fourteenth Amendment due process required
payment of just compensation,113 but the decision broke no new
conceptual ground. The Court had long insisted on that point in
prior due process adjudication. In 1876, the Court said in Munn
v. Illinois that the “power of the State over the property of the
citizen” under Fourteenth Amendment due process “is well defined. The State may take his property for public uses, upon just
compensation being made therefore,” or it may tax or “control
the use and possession of his property, so far as may be necessary for the protection of the rights of others, and to secure to
them the equal use and enjoyment of their property.”114 The
Munn case turned on other issues, however; the “just compensation” language was pure dictum.
A decade later in Stone v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co., the
Court reiterated that under Fourteenth Amendment due process, “the State cannot . . . do that which in law amounts to a
taking of private property for public use without just compensation, or without due process of law.”115 In Mugler v. Kansas,
the Court opined that under the states’ power of eminent domain, “property may not be taken for public use without compensation.”116 In Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Smith, the
Court explained that states could regulate intrastate railroad
rates, “subject to the limitation that the carriage is not required

110. Id. at 235.
111. Id. at 236.
112. See id. at 255–56.
113. Id. at 237–38 (citing state and lower federal court cases holding that
due process requires just compensation, and dicta in previous Supreme Court
cases citing that doctrine with approval).
114. 94 U.S. 113, 145 (1876) (emphasis added).
115. 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886).
116. 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887).
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without reward, or upon conditions amounting to the taking of
property for public use without just compensation.”117 Two
years later in Searl v. School District No. 2, the Court emphasized that a state’s eminent domain power “cannot be exercised
except upon condition that just compensation shall be made to
the owner.”118 Sweet v. Rechel reaffirmed this principle, asserting that when “the legislature provides for the actual taking
and appropriation of private property for public uses, its authority to enact such a regulation rests upon its right of eminent domain” and “it is a condition precedent to the exercise of
such power that the statute make provision for reasonable
compensation to the owner.”119
Beyond these utterances, which were mainly dicta, the
Court had heard and decided several cases predicated upon the
legal theory that the Fourteenth Amendment required compensation when a state “took” property by regulation. In Powell v.
Pennsylvania, the Court rejected a manufacturer’s claim that a
statutory prohibition on oleomargarine took its property without compensation, finding the regulation a legitimate police
power measure, not a property deprivation.120 In Yesler v.
Washington Harbor Line Commissioners, the Court said that
Fourteenth Amendment due process “undoubtedly forbids any
arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty or property,” and “assum[ed
it had] jurisdiction to revise the judgment of a State tribunal
upholding a law authorizing the taking of private property
without compensation.”121 The Yesler Court, however, found
that no property had been taken by the drawing of harbor lines,
despite impairment to the value of claimant’s wharf.122 Similar
is Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co.123
117. 128 U.S. 174, 179 (1888).
118. 133 U.S. 553, 562 (1890).
119. 159 U.S. 380, 399 (1895).
120. 127 U.S. 678, 686–687 (1888) (holding “without merit” the claim that
the statute “is in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment in that it deprives
the defendant of his property without that compensation required by law” (citing Mugler, 123 U.S. 623)).
121. 146 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1892).
122. Id. at 656–57.
123. 142 U.S. 254, 269 (1891) (stating that although the state court had not
explicitly addressed the federal constitutional question, it “could not have
reached a conclusion . . . without holding, either that none of [defendant’s]
property had been taken, or that it was not entitled to compensation therefor,
which is equivalent to saying that it had not been deprived of its property
without due process of law”). The Kaukauna Court concluded, however, that
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Clearly, then, the Court had understood throughout the
entire course of its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence that
due process required payment of just compensation when a
state took property by eminent domain or otherwise. The significance of the Chicago B & Q holding was that it securely anchored that well-established conception of due process in binding Fourteenth Amendment legal precedent.
The Chicago B & Q case also required the Court to decide a
second issue, implicating an equally important strand of due
process doctrine. The railroad argued that in addition to compensation for the easement, it was entitled to compensation for
the gates, operating tower, planking and fill, and additional operating costs necessitated by the grade crossing.124 The Court
rejected this claim, citing Mugler and other due process precedents,125 and held that compensation was not required for
losses incurred in consequence of a valid police power exercise,126 because “all property . . . is held subject to the authority
of the State to regulate its use in such manner as not to unnecessarily endanger the lives and the personal safety of the people,” and any property damaged or diminished in value by such
regulations “is not, within the meaning of the Constitution,
taken for public use, nor is the owner deprived of it without due
process of law.”127
Chicago B & Q thus perfectly mirrored the well-established
nineteenth-century understanding that the state’s powers, as
constrained by due process, were bifurcated. When it exercised
the eminent domain power, it owed just compensation. When it
enacted a valid police power regulation, however, there was by
definition no deprivation of property because all property rights
were held subject to the inherent police power limitation, and
no compensation was owed. In subsequent years, Chicago
B & Q would be cited as frequently for this latter proposition as
for the companion holding that due process did require compensation in cases of eminent domain.128
there “was no taking of the property.” Id. at 282.
124. 166 U.S. 226, 251–52 (1896).
125. Id. at 252–55.
126. Id. at 252 (“The requirement that compensation be made for private
property taken for public use imposes no restriction upon the inherent power
of the State by reasonable regulations to protect the lives and secure the
safety of the people.”).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., W. Chi. St. R.R. Co. v. Illinois ex rel. Chicago, 201 U.S. 506,
526 (1906) (holding that costs of removing obstructions to navigation “cannot
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To reach its just compensation holding, the Chicago B & Q
Court did not find it necessary to extend the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause to the states, nor did it cite to any Takings
Clause precedent. Instead, the Court found that the just compensation principle was an “essential element of” the due process guarantee itself,129 citing its own dicta in prior due process
cases,130 lower court due process holdings,131 and Thomas Cooley’s treatises as general “authority” for the proposition that
“natural equity” and “universal law” so required.132
The Chicago B & Q Court also argued by analogy from
precedents holding that due process barred a state from taking
property without a “public use.”133 In all jurisdictions, the public use and just compensation requirements worked in tandem
to constrain eminent domain, and since due process already required one, the reasonable inference was that it also required
the other.
Nowhere did Chicago B & Q explicitly or implicitly equate
the scope and contours of the Fourteenth Amendment due
process just compensation requirement with that of the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause; such a holding was unnecessary
to the outcome.
be deemed a taking of private property for public use” but are “only the result
of the lawful exercise of a governmental power for the common good”); Fla. E.
Coast Ry. Co. v. Martin County, 171 So. 2d 873, 876–77 (Fla. 1965) (holding
that costs of safety measures are “the result of the exercise of the police powers of the state” and not compensable); accord Pa.-Reading Seashore Lines v.
Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm’rs, 81 A.2d 28, 31 (N.J. App. Div. 1951), aff ’d, 83 A.2d
774 (N.J. 1951); Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. City of Houston, 41 S.W.2d 352,
354–55 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
129. Chicago B & Q, 166 U.S. at 235.
130. See id. at 238 (citing Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 398 (1895), and
Searl v. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 133 U.S. 553, 562 (1890)).
131. See Chicago B & Q, 166 U.S. at 238–39 (citing state and lower federal
court cases holding that due process required just compensation in eminent
domain, including Baker v. Vill. of Norwood, 74 F. 997 (S.D. Ohio 1896), aff ’d,
172 U.S. 269 (1898); Mount Hope Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 519
(Mass. 1893); Scott v. Toledo, 36 F. 385, 395–96 (N.D. Ohio 1888); Henderson
v. Cent. Passenger Ry. Co., 21 F. 358 (D. Ky. 1884), appeal dismissed, 140 U.S.
633 (1891)).
132. See Chicago B & Q, 166 U.S. at 236, 240–41.
133. See id. at 235–36 (citing Missouri Pac. I, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896)
(“The taking by a state of the private property of one person or corporation,
without the owner's consent, for the private use of another, is not due process
of law . . . .”); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 (1877) (“[A] statute
which declares . . . that the full and exclusive title of a described piece of land,
which is now in A., shall be and is hereby vested in B., would . . . deprive A. of
his property without due process of law . . . .”)).
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C. THE PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF BARRON
The Chicago B & Q opinion did not overrule—or even mention—Barron v. Baltimore,134 the well-known and widely cited
precedent that had expressly limited the Takings Clause to the
federal government. Nor did Chicago B & Q make any reference to Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley,135 which
months earlier had reaffirmed Barron’s core holding.136 The
only reasonable inference is that the Chicago B & Q Court
thought the scope of the Fifth Amendment was well settled and
undisturbed by its own holding.
In the decades that followed, courts would continue to cite
Fallbrook for the proposition that the Takings Clause did not
apply to states.137
More importantly, courts also continued to cite Barron as
good law, relying on it to limit the Takings Clause and other
Bill of Rights provisions to the federal government, without acknowledging Chicago B & Q as having limited or disturbed its
central holding. Two years after Chicago B & Q, the Supreme
Court cited Barron for the proposition that “[t]he first ten
amendments to the Federal Constitution contain no restrictions
on the powers of the States,” without mentioning Chicago B &
Q.138 The Court continued to cite Barron as good law until
1958, usually for the broad proposition that the entire Bill of
Rights applied only to the federal government.139 Remarkably,
134. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
135. 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
136. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir.
1975) (holding that the Takings Clause “applies only to a taking by the federal
Government, and not to actions by state agencies” (citing Fallbrook, 164 U.S.
at 158)); accord Riley v. Atkinson, 413 F. Supp. 413, 415 (N.D. Miss. 1975);
City of Boston v. Mass. Port Auth., 320 F. Supp. 1317, 1319 (D. Mass. 1971);
Elkins-Swyers Office Equip. Co. v. Moniteau County, 209 S.W.2d 127, 130
(Mo. 1948); Demeter Land Co. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Co., 128 So. 402, 405–06 (Fla.
1930); Bemis v. Guirl Drainage Co., 105 N.E. 496, 499 (Ind. 1914).
138. Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 174 (1899).
139. See Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 376 & n.2 (1958) (holding that
the first ten amendments “are not restrictions upon the vast domain of the
criminal law that belongs exclusively to the States” (citing Barron, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) at 250)); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359,
366 (1952) (holding that “the first ten Amendments . . . . are not concerned
with state action and deal only with Federal action” (citing Barron, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) at 243)); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 490 (1944) (“[E]ver
since Barron v. Baltimore, one of the settled principles of our Constitution has
been that these [Bill of Rights] Amendments protect only against invasion of
civil liberties by the [federal] Government . . . .” (citation omitted)); United
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Barron has never been expressly overruled to this day, although it now seems incontrovertible that Penn Central abrogated it by implication.140
Nor does the historical evidence support the thesis that
Chicago B & Q had carved out an exception to Barron.141 Quite
the contrary: on at least four occasions after Chicago B & Q,
the Supreme Court summarily dismissed Takings Clause
claims against states, citing Barron and derivative cases holding that the Fifth Amendment applied only to the federal government. In Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, the Court dismissed a Takings Clause challenge to an Ohio statute, stating
“it is elementary that [the Fifth] amendment operates solely on
the National Government and not the States.”142 In Winous
Point Shooting Club v. Caspersen, the Court dismissed another
Takings Clause case against Ohio, asserting the familiar Barron rule that the Fifth Amendment “is a restriction on Federal
power, and not on the power of the States.”143 In Thomas
Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, the Court refused to hear a Takings Clause claim against the city, citing Barron-derived precedents, but did consider plaintiff’s alternative Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim.144 In Palmer v. Ohio, the Court
summarily dismissed yet another Takings Clause claim against
Ohio, labeling it “palpably groundless” under Barron.145
The question of the Takings Clause’s applicability to states
did not re-emerge in the Supreme Court for many years after
States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (holding that “[t]he Fifth Amendment, like all the other guaranties in the first eight amendments, applies only
to proceedings by the Federal Government” (citing Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at
250)); Gasquet v. Lapeyre, 242 U.S. 367, 369 (1917) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment “is not restrictive of state, but only of national, action” (citing
Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 250)).
140. Westlaw’s KeyCite service lists Barron as having “some negative history but not overruled,” citing only two lower court cases as “negative indirect
history.” Search of WESTLAW, Keycite service (Jan. 25, 2006) (search for cases
citing Barron). One of those, Silveira v. Lockyer, cited Barron as a “nowrejected” precedent, without explanation. 312 F.3d 1052, 1067 n.17 (9th Cir.
2002). Similarly, United States v. Emerson questioned the applicability of
precedents based on Barron. 270 F.3d 203, 221 n.13 (5th Cir. 2001).
141. This would have been inconsistent with Barron’s central holding that
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause did not apply to the states. See supra
notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
142. 183 U.S. 238, 245 (1902).
143. 193 U.S. 189, 191 (1904).
144. 242 U.S. 526, 528 (1917) (“Obviously, claims made under the Fifth
Amendment need not be considered . . . .” (citations omitted)).
145. 248 U.S. 32, 34 (1918).
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Palmer, but this likely reflects widespread acceptance of Barron and its progeny. The issue did periodically arise in state
courts, however, which until the 1970s continued to hold that
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause applied only to the federal government.146 Lower federal courts concurred in this view
until shortly before Penn Central was decided,147 as did leading
commentators in the post-Chicago B & Q era.148
146. See, e.g., Citizens Util. Co. v. Metro. Sanitary Dist., 322 N.E.2d 857,
860 n.4 (Ill. App. 1974) (holding that the Takings Clause “is a limitation only
on the powers of the federal government”); Farmington River Co. v. Town Plan
& Zoning Comm’n, 197 A.2d 653, 658 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1963) (stating that the
Takings Clause “does not restrain a state in the exercise of its authority”); Williams v. State Highway Comm’n, 113 S.E.2d 263, 265 (N.C. 1960) (ruling that
the Takings Clause “is a limitation upon the federal government, and not upon
the states”); accord State v. Kansas City, 262 P. 1032, 1034 (Kan. 1928); Nectow v. Cambridge, 157 N.E. 618, 620 (Mass. 1927); Camden Fire Ins. Ass’n v.
Haston, 284 S.W. 905, 908 (Tenn. 1926); Smith v. Cameron, 210 P. 716, 718
(Or. 1922); Banner Milling Co. v. State, 191 N.Y.S. 143, 150 (N.Y. Ct. Cl.
1921); Wright v. House, 121 N.E. 433, 435 (Ind. 1919); Riley v. Charleston Union Station Co., 51 S.E. 485, 487 (S.C. 1905).
147. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112, 122 n.6 (3d. Cir. 1977) (stating that in Chicago B & Q and other cases against municipalities “the prohibition against taking without just compensation . . . is derived directly from the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, without consideration of the
applicability of the Fifth Amendment”); Oakland Club v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth.,
110 F.2d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 1940) (holding the Takings Clause inapplicable because “no restrictions upon the States are imposed by this amendment”); Gulf
& S.I.R. Co. v. Ducksworth, 286 F. 645, 647 (5th Cir. 1923) (ruling that the
Takings Clause “bears alone upon the exercise of power by the United States
government and affords no ground for relief against the state”); accord Clark
v. Russell, 97 F. 900, 902 (8th Cir. 1899); Riley v. Atkinson, 413 F. Supp. 413,
415 (N.D. Miss. 1975); Wolfe v. Hurley, 46 F. 2d 515, 519 (W.D. La. 1930); Union Heat, Light & Power Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Ky., 17 F.2d 143, 145 (E.D. Ky.
1926); Quinby v. Cleveland, 191 F. 68, 75 (N.D. Ohio 1911); Am. Loan & Trust
Co. v. Grand Rivers Co., 159 F. 775, 778 (W.D. Ky. 1908).
148. Ernst Freund wrote seven years after Chicago B & Q, that “the first
ten amendments apply only to the federal government” while “[t]he fourteenth
amendment and the commerce clause are at present chiefly relied upon as
checks upon the police power of the states.” ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE
POWER 65 (1904); see also JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (3d ed. 1909) (stating that the Takings
Clause “applies only to the operations of the federal government and is not a
limitation on the power of the States,” but the “correct view” is that an exercise of eminent domain “without compensation . . . [is not] due process”);
PHILIP NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 126 (2d ed. 1917) (stating the
Takings Clause “is a limitation upon the power of the United States only and
is not applicable to the states” (citing Winous Point Shooting Club v. Caspersen, 193 U.S. 189 (1904), and Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243
(1833))); C. Robert Beirne, Excess Condemnation, 6 U. CIN. L. REV. 196, 201–
02 (1932) (stating that “[t]he Fifth Amendment . . . is a limitation only on the
federal government” and “throw[s] no light” on constitutional limits to the
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The historical record is unambiguous: Chicago B & Q was
not understood at the time it was decided, nor for many decades thereafter, to have extended the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to the states. That interpretation of Chicago B & Q
is a latter-day contrivance, at odds with historical understandings.
D. DOCTRINE WITH A DIFFERENCE: DUE PROCESS-BASED
TAKINGS
To be sure, Chicago B & Q did hold that Fourteenth
Amendment due process requires just compensation when
states take private property by eminent domain, a holding that
bears a strong facial similarity to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. Does my argument, then, amount to empty formalism or mere semantic quibble, a “distinction without a difference”? It does not.
Courts and commentators certainly understood Chicago
B & Q as an important due process precedent,149 but at no time
prior to Penn Central did the Court hold that Fourteenth
Amendment due process-based “takings” doctrine was identical
to, or coextensive with, that of the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause.150 From Fallbrook and Chicago B & Q forward, the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and Fourteenth Amendment
due process-based “takings” doctrine operated as parallel and
“similar,”151 but nonetheless distinct and independent strands
of constitutional doctrine, stemming from separate sources in
the constitutional text, each with its own canonical precedents.
Prior to Penn Central, courts did not borrow freely from Takstate’s power of eminent domain); T.D. Havran, Eminent Domain and the Police Power, 5 NOTRE DAME LAW. 380, 381–82 (1930) (stating that the Takings
Clause “is exclusively a restriction upon the powers of the federal government
and not a restraint upon the states,” but “a taking of property for a private use
or without just compensation is a deprivation of property without due process”
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
149. See, e.g., FREUND, supra note 148, at 541–42 (stating that “the taking
for public use without compensation has never in any civilised country been
regarded as a legitimate exercise of state power, and the payment of compensation is therefore correctly held to be a requirement of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment”).
150. The court did rule that the measure of compensation—“the market
value of the property at the time of the taking”—is the same under both the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255
(1934). That did not mean, however, that the doctrines were identical as to
what counted as a “taking.”
151. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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ings Clause precedents to resolve Fourteenth Amendment due
process-based claims, or vice versa.152
In Wight v. Davidson, the Court expressed serious doubts
that prior Fourteenth Amendment decisions could have any
precedential value in a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
case.153 In Wight, a District of Columbia property owner challenged a special assessment for street improvements as a Fifth
Amendment taking, citing as precedent Norwood v. Baker
which on similar facts held an Ohio city had taken plaintiff ’s
property without due process.154 The Wight Court questioned
Norwood’s relevance, pointing out that the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process clause “in terms, operates only to control action of the States,” and “it by no means necessarily follows that a long and consistent construction put upon the Fifth
Amendment, and maintaining the validity of the acts of Congress . . . is to be deemed overruled by a decision concerning the
operation of the Fourteenth Amendment as controlling state
legislation.”155
The Court’s insistence on the independence of the two provisions drew a sharp rebuke from Justice Harlan, who wrote in
dissent:
It is inconceivable to me that the question whether a person has been
deprived of his property without due process of law can be determined
upon principles applicable under the Fourteenth Amendment but not
applicable under the Fifth Amendment, or upon principles applicable

152. Compare Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (deciding a Fourteenth Amendment due process case based on due process precedents), with United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (deciding a Takings
Clause case based on Fifth Amendment precedents). A singular exception is
Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), where the Court relied on a
federal Takings Clause case, United States v. Causby, to resolve a due process
claim against a local government. Id. at 88–89. The legal question in both
Griggs and Causby was whether government-authorized overflights at low altitudes had “taken” an easement on land near airports. Compare Griggs, 369
U.S. at 84–85 (“The question is whether respondent has taken an air easement
over petitioner's property for which it must pay just compensation as required
by the Fourteenth Amendment.”), with Causby, 328 U.S. at 258 (“The problem
presented is whether respondents’ property was taken, within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment, by frequent and regular flights of army and navy aircraft over respondents’ land at low altitudes.”). Because Griggs turned on a
physical invasion rather than the police power, it was atypical of Fourteenth
Amendment just compensation cases of the pre-Penn Central era.
153. 181 U.S. 371, 384 (1901).
154. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 294 (1898).
155. 181 U.S. at 384.
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under the Fifth and not applicable under the Fourteenth Amendment.156

Harlan’s was the minority view, however. Lower courts
continued to cite Wight for the proposition that the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments were separate and independent constitutional requirements in the decades that followed.157 Other
cases expressed similar doubts about the relevance of Fourteenth Amendment precedents to Fifth Amendment cases, or
vice-versa.158
The standard post-Chicago B & Q consensus was that
states were obliged to pay just compensation when they took
property by eminent domain not because the textual mandate
of the Fifth Amendment applied to them, but rather because
that obligation inhered in the nature of “due process” itself, as
a matter of natural equity and universal practice.159 As the
Court explained in Twining v. New Jersey:
[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the
first eight Amendments against national action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law. If this is so, it is not because those rights are
enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because they are of
such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process
of law.160

Indeed, the Court had some difficulty explaining how Fourteenth Amendment due process could require just compensation at all. The Fifth Amendment had both a due process guarantee and a separate Takings Clause. Reading just compensation into “due process” threatened to render the Takings

156. Id. at 387 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
157. See, e.g., Neild v. District of Columbia, 110 F.2d 246, 250 n.10 (D.C.
Cir. 1940); Lappin v. District of Columbia, 22 App. D.C. 68 (D.C. Cir. 1903).
158. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Welch, 327 U.S.
546, 552 (1946) (“[W]hatever may be the scope of judicial power to determine
what is a ‘public use’ in Fourteenth Amendment controversies, this Court has
said that when Congress has spoken on this subject, [i]ts decision is entitled to
deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility.” (internal citation and
quotation omitted)); People of Puerto Rico v. E. Sugar Assocs., 156 F.2d 316,
322 (1st Cir. 1946) (arguing that “public use” requirements of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments differ).
159. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 390–91 (1898) (“Recognizing the
difficulty in defining, with exactness, the phrase ‘due process of law,’ it is certain that these words imply a conformity with natural and inherent principles
of justice, and forbid that one man’s property, or right to property, shall be
taken for the benefit of another, or for the benefit of the State, without compensation.”).
160. 211 U.S. 78, 99 (emphasis added).
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Clause superfluous.161 But it was equally problematic to say
that “due process” carried different meanings in the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Fifth: for why would the drafters employ a
term already used in the constitutional text, but attach a different meaning?162 The Court attempted to resolve this dilemma—not entirely satisfactorily—by resorting to essentialism, explaining in Powell v. Alabama that the ordinary rule of
interpretation “is not without exceptions” and is merely “an aid
to construction” which “must yield to more compelling considerations.”163 The scope of Fourteenth Amendment due process,
Powell said, turned on whether “the right involved is of such a
character that it cannot be denied without violating those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions.’”164 The right to compensation in eminent domain was “of this fundamental character.”165
This understanding, however, only reinforced the conceptual wall separating the Bill of Rights from Fourteenth
Amendment due process. The mandates of the first eight
amendments were specific and detailed, sprang from a precisely located textual source, and did not control the meaning
or content of the more generally phrased Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee,166 although the requirements at

161. The Court had used this argument in Hurtado v. California, rejecting
the claim that due process required grand jury presentment or indictment in
state criminal cases:
According to a recognized canon of interpretation, especially applicable to formal and solemn instruments of constitutional law, we are
forbidden to assume, without clear reason to the contrary, that any
part of this most important amendment is superfluous. The natural
and obvious inference is, that in the sense of the Constitution, “due
process of law” was not meant or intended to include . . . the institution and procedure of a grand jury in any case.
110 U.S. 516, 534 (1884).
162. See id. at 535. (“[W]hen the same phrase was employed in the Fourteenth Amendment to restrain the action of the States, it was used in the
same sense and with no greater extent [than in the Fifth Amendment].”).
163. 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932).
164. Id. (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
165. Id.
166. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461–62 (1942) (“The due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate, as such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment . . . [but instead] formulates a
concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and
particular provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its application is less a matter of
rule.”), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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times might be parallel or overlapping.167
Because a case would arise under one clause or the other,
not both, the Court never had need to spell out exactly what the
differences were, but examination of the doctrines reveals one
overriding difference. That difference reflected the basic federalist understanding discussed in Part II.A: throughout the prePenn Central period, the Court adhered to the view expressed
in Munn, Mugler, Chicago B & Q, and subsequent cases, that a
valid exercise of the state’s police power could never amount to
a compensable deprivation of property under Fourteenth
Amendment due process, because the state’s reserved power to
regulate in the interest of harm prevention and the public good
operated as an inherent limitation on state-recognized property
rights. In a due process-based challenge to a state or local regulation, the first step in the court’s analysis was to ask: “Is this
regulation a valid exercise of the police power?” An affirmative
answer was dispositive: no property had been taken, due process was satisfied, and no compensation was owed.
In contrast, because property rights were defined by state
and not federal law, federal regulations were not understood to
operate as an inherent limitation on property rights, and could
amount to a compensable “taking” under the Fifth Amendment
even if otherwise valid as an exercise of federal power. As the
Court explained in 1903 in United States v. Lynah:
[L]ike the other powers granted to Congress by the Constitution, the
power to regulate commerce is subject to all the limitations imposed
by such instrument, and among them is that of the Fifth Amendment . . . . Congress has supreme control over the regulation of commerce, but if, in exercising that supreme control it deems it necessary
to take private property, then it must proceed subject to the limitations imposed by this Fifth Amendment, and can take only on payment of just compensation.168

167. See id. at 462 (“[A] denial by a state of rights or privileges specifically
embodied in . . . the first eight amendments may, in certain circumstances, or
in connection with other elements, operate, in a given case, to deprive a litigant of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth.”); see also Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The general
principle of free speech . . . must be taken to be included in the Fourteenth
Amendment [but] with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than . . .
that [which] governs or ought to govern the laws of the United States.”).
168. 188 U.S. 445, 471 (1903) (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 336 (1893)), overruled in part by United States v.
Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941); Scranton v.
Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 153 (1900) (“[I]n its exercise of the power to regulate
commerce, Congress may not override the provision that just compensation
must be made when private property is taken for public use.”).
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This led to major differences in how cases were argued and
analyzed. Consider the different analyses accorded federal and
state efforts to grant relief to debt-burdened farmers and
homeowners during the Great Depression. When states enacted
debt relief schemes, the police power was dispositive in determining whether a Fourteenth Amendment property deprivation
had occurred. For example, the Court upheld a Minnesota statute providing for an equitable stay of home mortgage foreclosures as a reasonable “emergency” exercise of the state’s police
power under the economic exigencies of the time.169 But a more
drastic Arkansas statute canceling the debts of defaulting
mortgagors was overturned as beyond the reasonable bounds of
the police power, the Court finding it “without moderation or
reason” and “in a spirit of oppression” to mortgagees whose assets were stripped of all value.170
In contrast, when the federal government acted the police
power played no role, nor did any other assertion of federal
power operate as an inherent limitation on property rights. In
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, the Court held
that a federal law creating a statutory five-year stay on farm
mortgage foreclosures and limiting the mortgagor’s repayment
obligation to the present fair market value of the property was
a Fifth Amendment taking.171 The Court reasoned that although the measure might be a valid exercise of Congress’s
bankruptcy power, the “bankruptcy power, like the other great
substantive powers of Congress, is subject to the Fifth Amendment.”172 Because the mortgagee’s lien and right to take possession in foreclosure were considered property rights under
Kentucky law, the Court determined that the federal statute
“tak[es] . . . substantive rights in specific property acquired by
the Bank.”173 In short, state law set the baseline of property
rights against which the Court would determine whether a federal regulation had taken property under the Fifth Amendment, and neither the police power nor any enumerated federal
power would insulate a challenged regulation from that Fifth
Amendment inquiry.

169. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447–48 (1934)
(upholding a Minnesota statute as a reasonable police power measure).
170. W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1935).
171. 295 U.S. 555, 601–02 (1935).
172. Id. at 589.
173. Id. at 590.
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This did not mean that states had carte blanche to rewrite
property law at their whim, however. Courts insisted that some
purported exercises of the police power might be pretextual or
so unreasonable or arbitrary as to fall outside the legitimate
bounds of that power. As the Court explained in Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad. Co. v. Goldsboro:
[I]f it appear that the regulation under criticism is not in any way designed to promote the health, comfort, safety, or welfare of the community, or that the means employed have no real and substantial relation to the avowed or ostensible purpose, or that there is wanton or
arbitrary interference with private rights, the question arises
whether the law-making body has exceeded the legitimate bounds of
the police power.174

This placed the judiciary in the delicate position of policing
the rather indefinite boundary separating valid police power
regulations from arbitrary or unreasonable regulations or disguised exercises of the (compensable) power of eminent domain—the classic substantive due process inquiry.175
So, for example, in Missouri Pacific Railway. Co. v. Nebraska (Missouri Pac II), the Court held that a state regulation
requiring the railroad to construct, at its own expense, a side
track to serve a grain elevator located adjacent to the railroad’s
right-of-way “goes beyond the limit of the police power,” and
therefore effected an unconstitutional deprivation or “taking” of
property as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment due process.176
Anticipating Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon by more than a
decade, Justice Holmes for the Court wrote that while “the
States have power to modify and cut down property rights to a
certain limited extent without compensation, for public purposes, as a necessary incident of government—the police
power,” nonetheless “there are constitutional limits to what can
be required of . . . owners under either the police power or any
other ostensible justification for taking such property away.”177

174. 232 U.S. 548, 559 (1914); see also FREUND, supra note 148, at 124
(“Under the Fourteenth Amendment the United States is competent to protect
individual liberty and property against arbitrary or unequal state legislation
enacted under color of protection of safety and health, but having in reality no
such justification.”).
175. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) (“For just as there
comes a point at which the police power ceases and leaves only that of eminent
domain, it may be conceded that regulations of the present sort pressed to a
certain height might amount to a taking without due process of law.”).
176. 217 U.S. 196, 207 (1910).
177. Id. at 206.
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E. MAHON IN THE MUDDLE
Placed in its proper historical context as one of a long line
of Fourteenth Amendment due process cases policing the
boundary between the police power and eminent domain, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon178 was unremarkable when it was
decided and was uniformly recognized in the pre-Penn Central
era as a rather ordinary substantive due process case.179 Modern myth notwithstanding, it was not the first case to invalidate a regulatory enactment as an impermissible “taking” of
property,180 and it had relatively little subsequent doctrinal
178. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
179. A 1927 Harvard Law review article listed Mahon as one of twentyeight “police power cases” invalidating “substantive legislation of a social or
economic character” on due process grounds. See Ray A. Brown, Due Process of
Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HARV. L. REV. 943, 944 (1927);
see also John J. Costonis, “Fair” Compensation and the Accommodation Power:
Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1021, 1034 (1975) (stating that “all that Pennsylvania Coal actually decided was that the statute challenged in that case was an invalid police power
measure”); Thomas Reed Powell, The Supreme Court and State Police Power,
1922–1930, 18 VA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1931) (stating that Mahon held the Kohler
Act “to go beyond proper police power” because “the statute is not necessary
for safety”). Courts concurred. See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State
Highway Comm’n, 294 U.S. 613, 621 (1935) (stating that in Mahon “the court
refused to sustain a Pennsylvania statute as an exercise of the police power”);
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 415 n.7
(1935) (citing Mahon for the proposition that “[t]he police power is subject to
the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably”); Hulen v. City of Corsicana, 65 F.2d 969, 970 (5th Cir. 1933) (citing
Mahon for the proposition that the limits of the police power are “shadowy,
vague, and shifting” and “it is in the last analysis for the courts to say”
whether “the power is being exercised reasonably”); Marblehead Land Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, 47 F.2d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 1931) (stating that Mahon held
the statute “so unreasonable an exercise of the police power that it was violative of the constitutional rights” of the coal company); Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 9 (N.Y. 1976) (stating that in
Mahon “the gravamen of the constitutional challenge to the regulatory measure was that it was an invalid exercise of the police power under the due process clause” and the case was “decided under that rubric”); McCarthy v. City of
Manhattan Beach, 264 P.2d 932, 939 (Cal. 1954) (stating that Mahon held the
statute “beyond the legitimate scope of the police power”).
180. See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 328 (1921) (overturning a
statute prohibiting injunctions against labor picketing because it “deprives the
owner of the business and the premises of his property without due process”);
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (invalidating an ordinance barring
the sale of property to persons of color as “state interference with property
rights” without due process because it lacks a legitimate police power justification); Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165 (1914) (invalidating a statute doubling a railroad’s liability as deprivation of property without due process); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 144 (1912)
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impact.181 Mahon was cited infrequently,182 and then usually to
invoke familiar nostrums about the scope and limits of the police power, such as: “[w]hile [the] police power is broad, there
are limitations to its exercise,”183 or “some values are enjoyed
(invalidating an ordinance authorizing two-thirds of property owners to establish building setback requirements as “an unreasonable exercise of the police
power” depriving owners of property without due process); St. Louis, Iron
Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354, 360–61 (1912) (invalidating as
“wanting in due process and repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment” a statute doubling a railroad’s liability for killing livestock, which “takes property
from one and gives it to another”); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska (Missouri Pac.
II ), 217 U.S. 196, 205 (1910) (invalidating an order compelling construction of
sidetracks to serve private grain elevators because it “take[s]” the railroad’s
property without compensation); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Cent. Stock
Yards Co., 212 U.S. 132, 143–44 (1909) (invalidating a statute requiring a
railroad to deliver cars to another line as an “unlawful taking of its property”
violating due process); Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 241 (1904) (invalidating an ordinance stringently regulating gas works as an “arbitrary and
discriminatory exercise of the police power which amounts to a taking of property without due process of law”); Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 173
U.S. 684, 699 (1899) (invalidating a statute fixing preferential railroad rates
as beyond the police power and a “taking of property without due process of
law”); Missouri Pac. I, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (invalidating an order authorizing construction of a private grain elevator on a railroad right-of-way as “a
taking of private property of the railroad corporation, for the private use of the
petitioners” and “not due process of law”). In the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause context, see, e.g., Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546
(1914) (finding that the Takings Clause bars Congress from immunizing a
railroad against private nuisance actions, which would be a “taking” of an adjacent landowner’s property).
181. See Brauneis, supra note 25, at 665 (stating that Mahon was initially
cited with moderate frequency but then “all but disappeared from the United
States Reports for over two decades” from 1936 to 1957). But cf. Treanor, supra note 25, at 861–64 (stating that Mahon was neither a “minor case” nor
“forgotten,” receiving scholarly attention when decided and later becoming
part of Holmes’s widely cited “canon”). Treanor admits, however, that Mahon
did not significantly influence the course of substantive due process jurisprudence, and that its pre-Penn Central prominence owed much to Holmes’s stature, the opinion’s epigramatic quality, and its apparent inconsistency with
Holmes’s generally deferential stance in substantive process cases. See id. at
862.
182. As of January 23, 2006, Westlaw’s KeyCite service listed 1174 judicial
citations to Mahon by federal and state courts. See Search of WESTLAW, KeyCite Service (Jan. 23, 2006) (search for court cases citing Mahon before and
after 1978). In the 56 years before Penn Central, Mahon was cited 395 times,
about seven citations per year. Id. In the 27 years after Penn Central, Mahon
was cited 779 times, roughly 28 citations per year. Id.
183. Women’s Kan. City St. Andrew Soc’y v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 593, 598
(8th Cir. 1932); see also W. Int’l Hotels v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 387 F.
Supp. 429, 434–35 (D. Nev. 1975) (citing Mahon for the proposition that “police power regulation had its limits,” an idea that “antedates even Holmes”);
Appeal of Key Realty Co., 182 A.2d 187, 191 (Pa. 1962) (citing Mahon for the
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under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power.”184 Rarely did Mahon supply the controlling legal principle in due process-based “takings” challenges to state185 or
federal regulation.186 Nor did Mahon play a decisive role in any
proposition that police power regulations are valid if “necessary for the preservation of public health, safety, morals or general welfare, and not unjustly discriminatory, or arbitrary, or unreasonable, or confiscatory”); Creasy v. Stevens, 160 F. Supp. 404, 410 (N.D. Pa. 1958) (citing Mahon for the proposition
that “[t]he ultimate decision as to proper exercise of the police power rests
with the courts, and, if the exercise goes too far, there is a judicial duty to investigate and declare the exercise of the police power invalid”), rev’d by Martin
v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959).
184. E.g., Brecciaroli v. Conn. Commr. of Envtl. Prot., 362 A.2d 948, 951
(Conn. 1975).
185. Mahon was mentioned prominently in Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co.
v. State Highway Commission, but that case turned on the lack of a public
safety rationale. See 294 U.S. 613, 621–23 (1935) (holding regulation requiring
alterations in gas transmission lines “arbitrary and unreasonable,” depriving
the plaintiff of property without due process). Mahon was not mentioned in
other prominent due process “property deprivation” cases like Williams v.
Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (overturning a state’s
regulation of gasoline prices); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105
(1928) (overturning a state ban on ownership of drug stores by nonpharmacists); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (holding that a
municipal zoning scheme as applied deprived the plaintiff of property without
due process); and Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(upholding a municipal zoning scheme against facial challenge). When Mahon
was cited, it was seldom controlling. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502, 552 (1934) (citing Mahon for the proposition that the wartime rent control
cases “involved peculiar facts and must be strictly limited”); accord Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 479 (1934); Tyson & Bro.-United
Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 437–38 (1927). Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead cited Mahon for the proposition that a regulation might
“be so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires compensation” and that “a comparison of values before and after is relevant” to
that determination, but Goldblatt went on to hold that such a comparison is
“by no means conclusive” and that the question “narrow[ed]” to whether the
challenged regulation was “a valid exercise of the police power.” See 369 U.S.
590, 594 (1962).
186. Fifth Amendment due process challenges to federal regulations affecting property were more common than Takings Clause-based “regulatory takings” cases in the pre-Penn Central era. See, e.g., N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S.
686 (1946) (holding an SEC regulation not unreasonable and not a “taking” of
property without due process); Valvoline Oil Co. v. United States, 308 U.S. 141
(1939) (upholding an ICC regulation against a claim that it “took” property
without due process); Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S.
470 (1938) (holding federally regulated stockyard rates not “confiscatory” and
not a due process violation); Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445 (1937)
(holding a Bankruptcy Act provision did not destroy property and not arbitrary or unreasonable, and consequently not a due process violation); R.R. Bd.
v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (holding compulsory participation in an
employee pension scheme arbitrarily deprived railroads of property without
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of the several dozen Fifth Amendment Takings Clause cases
that reached the Supreme Court in the pre-Penn Central era.187
Then, like Chicago B & Q, Mahon was plucked from relative obscurity and anachronistically recast as a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause precedent by Penn Central and its progeny.188 In that guise, it came to serve as one of the pillars of
contemporary regulatory takings jurisprudence.189
That Mahon was a Fourteenth Amendment and not a Fifth
Amendment case is apparent from the posture in which it
reached the Court. Mahon involved the constitutionality of
Pennsylvania’s Kohler Act, which prohibited the mining of coal
pillars providing subjacent support to certain surface owners.190
due process); Chi. Rock Island & Pac. Ry Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80
(1931) (holding an ICC regulation of rail cars reasonable and not arbitrary or
confiscatory, consequently not a due process violation); Tyler v. United States,
281 U.S. 497 (1930) (holding a federal estate tax provision not arbitrary or
confiscatory, consequently not a deprivation of property without due process);
Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923) (holding a federal regulation of the
commodity futures market reasonable, and an incidental reduction in value
did not deprive members of property without due process). Mahon, turning on
the scope of the states’ police power, was irrelevant to the resolution of these
federal cases, and was not cited.
187. The Supreme Court cited Mahon in only four Fifth Amendment Takings Clause cases prior to Penn Central, and it played a minor role in all of
them. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960) (citing Mahon as
an example of the “difficulty of trying to draw the line” in takings cases);
United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) (citing
Mahon for the proposition that takings cases “turn[ ] upon the particular circumstances of each case”); United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339
U.S. 121, 134 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing Mahon for the proposition that “the question depends upon the particular facts”); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508 (1923) (citing Mahon for the proposition that a doctrine allowing uncompensated destruction of property to stop
a fire “rest[s] on tradition”).
188. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127
(1978) (citing Mahon as “the leading case for the proposition that a state statute that substantially furthers important public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a ‘taking’”).
189. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 325 (2002) (stating that Mahon “gave birth to our regulatory
takings jurisprudence”); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014
(1992) (stating that prior to Mahon, “it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property”); San Diego Gas
& Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 648–49 (1981) (“The principle
[that a regulation can effect a Fifth Amendment ‘taking’] . . . has its source in
Justice Holmes’s opinion for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.”
(citation omitted)).
190. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412–13 (1922); Mahon v. Pa.
Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 492–93 (Pa. 1922) (setting forth provisions of the Kohler
Act), rev’d, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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Mahon held title to surface rights under a deed from the Pennsylvania Coal Company that had expressly reserved the Company’s right to mine all the subsurface coal without providing
subjacent support.191 When the company continued to mine and
gave notice of possible subsidence, Mahon sought an injunction.192 The Company argued that enforcement of the Kohler
Act would deprive it of property without due process. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the Act on due process
grounds as “a reasonable and valid exercise of the police
power.”193 The Company filed a writ of error, seeking reversal.
Thus the sole issue properly before the Court was, as Justice
Holmes put it, “whether the police power can be stretched so
far.”194
As a conventional substantive due process case turning on
the limits of the police power, Mahon broke no new conceptual
ground. Holmes began his opinion with an elegant restatement
of the difference between a valid police power regulation and an
implied exercise of eminent domain:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power.
But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in
determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.195

191. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412; Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co., 118 A. at 492 (“[S]o
far as the contractual rights of the respective parties are concerned, as shown
by the paper title to the properties involved, defendant is expressly authorized
to mine the subjacent strata owned by it without any obligation to support the
surface owned by plaintiffs.”).
192. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412; Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co., 118 A. at 492–93.
193. Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co., 118 A. at 492. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated the controlling legal principle:
[T]he state, under its police power, may lawfully impose such restrictions upon private rights as, in the wisdom of the Legislature, may be
deemed expedient; . . . for ‘all property in this country is held under
the implied obligation that the owner’s use of it shall not be injurious
to the community’ . . . [and] a statute enacted for the protection of
public health, safety or morals, can be set aside by the courts only
when it plainly has no real or substantial relation to these subjects, or
is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.
Id. at 493 (quoting Nolan v. Jones, 263 Pa. 124, 127–28 (Pa. 1919)).
194. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
195. Id.
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To Holmes, then, no bright line demarcated the boundary
between legitimate noncompensable exercises of the police
power and implied compensable exercises of eminent domain.
Instead, government actions are arrayed along a continuum
and may fall into either category depending upon the facts and
circumstances. “One fact for consideration”—presumably one of
several196—is the “extent of the diminution.”197
This latter statement is widely cited as Holmes’s enunciation of a “diminution of value” test for regulatory takings.198 If
any doctrinal innovation is to be found in Mahon, it is surely
this. Yet while Holmes flirts with the proposition that every
regulation effecting diminution of a “certain magnitude” must
fall outside the police power, Mahon never squarely so holds.
Strictly speaking, the statement that when “diminution . . . reaches a certain magnitude . . . there must be an exercise of eminent domain” is dictum.199
At bottom, and on arguments that closely track the dissenting opinion in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,200 Holmes
196. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (“There
is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins. Although a comparison of values before and after is relevant, see Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, . . . it is by no means conclusive.”).
197. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
198. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J.
36, 40–42 (1964). Sax emphasized Holmes’s statement in Interstate Consolidated Street Railway Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87 (1907) (upholding a
statute mandating half-price streetcar fares for school children), that “the
question narrows itself to the magnitude of the burden imposed.” See Sax, supra, at 41. But that statement must be considered in context. Weighing
whether the regulation went too far, Holmes first noted that Massachusetts
regards education as a police power purpose of the first magnitude. See Interstate Colsol. St. Ry. Co., 207 U.S. at 87 (“Education is one of the purposes for
which . . . the police power may be exercised. Massachusetts always has recognized it as one of the first objects of public care. It does not follow that it would
be equally in accord with the conceptions at the base of our constitutional law
to confer equal favors upon doctors, or workingmen, or people who could afford
to buy 1000-mile tickets.”). Only after placing great weight on the public interest side of the ledger did Holmes consider the private economic burden, and at
that point “the question narrow[ed] itself to the magnitude of the burden.” Id.
Holmes concluded, however, that the public interest in education outweighed
the private burden. Id. at 87–88. This was a balancing, not a diminution of
value test.
199. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
200. See Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 497 (Pa. 1922) (Kephardt, J.,
dissenting) (deriding majority’s expansive conception under which “the exercise of this [police] power becomes nothing more than the will of the Legislature” and “property may be transferred, by the Legislature from one person to
another without compensation”); id. at 499 (arguing that if the intent were to
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simply finds the police power justifications for the Kohler Act
wanting. As Holmes sees it, the Act’s restrictions on subsurface
mining protect the private interests of a narrow class of surface
owners—those who had not bargained for subjacent support, as
they clearly could have done under Pennsylvania law.201 These
owners gain a windfall at the direct expense of subsurface mineral owners who had bargained—and paid for—the right to
mine the coal. With regard to subsidence affecting this narrow
class, Holmes says, “the damage is not common or public.”202
The absence of any genuine public interest in preventing subsidence is confirmed, Holmes says, by the fact that subsidence is
permissible where the mining company owns the surface
rights.203 Certainly, the legislature might proceed piecemeal to
protect some property owners, and Holmes concedes that “there
is a public interest even in this, as there is in every purchase
and sale and in all that happens within the commonwealth.”204
But the public interest here, Holmes concludes, is “limited,”205
and is advanced only by stripping other property owners of

protect safety the statute “could have required a notice” before mining); id.
(arguing the purpose of the statute was “merely to augment property rights of
the few” and “the public generally, as distinguished from this particular class,
is not interested”); id. at 500–01 (characterizing the Kohler Act as “class” legislation which does not “protect from all such subsidences” but operates “for
the sole benefit of ” surface owners who had expressly waived their right to
subjacent support, “confiscat[ing] defendant’s coal for plaintiff ’s benefit” and
“forc[ing] the coal companies, who have already paid for this property right
once, to pay for it again”).
201. Pennsylvania law required subjacent support unless the surface
owner expressly waived that right by grant or reservation. See Penman v.
Jones, 256 Pa. 416, 422 (Pa. 1917) (“The law is firmly established in Pennsylvania that, in the absence of express waiver or the use of words from which
the intention to waive clearly appears, the grantee of minerals takes the estate
subject to the burden of surface support”). A waiver created a distinct interest
or “estate” that could be separately assigned or conveyed. See id. at 427–29
(holding that although the coal company had expressly reserved the support
estate, that interest did not pass to the purchaser of mineral rights unless expressly assigned or conveyed).
202. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413; cf. Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co., 118 A. at 510 (stating that the Act “transfers an independent property right to plaintiff, vesting
the permanent use and perpetual enjoyment of this right in one who is not required to pay anything for what he so acquires, and which he may sell in selling his surface, with the increased value given it by this legislation”).
203. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413–14 (“The extent of the public interest is
shown by the statute to be limited, since the statute ordinarily does not apply
to land when the surface is owned by the owner of the coal.”).
204. Id. at 413.
205. Id. at 414.
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their rights. To Holmes, that smacks of naked redistribution,
not any genuine “public interest.”
By the time Mahon was decided, there was ample precedent for striking down such redistributive regulations as impermissible “takings” of property under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.206 Holmes later explained in a
letter to Frederick Pollock: “My ground [for decision in Mahon]
is that the public only got on this land by paying for it and that
if they saw fit to pay only for the surface rights they can’t
enlarge it.”207
Holmes also concluded the statute could not be justified as
a reasonable safety measure because for that purpose a simple
notice requirement would suffice.208 In any event, Holmes
notes, the mining company gave actual notice in this case, so
there was no threat to Mahon’s safety.209
The Mahon analysis, while proceeding within the standard
police power framework, nonetheless evidences a characteristically Holmesian departure from the more formalistic treatment
a similar case might have received at the hands of other judges.
206. See, e.g., St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U.S.
354, 360–61 (1912) (invalidating as “wanting in due process of law, and repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment” a statute doubling a railroad’s liability
for killing livestock, which “takes property from one and gives it to another”);
Missouri Pac. II, 217 U.S. 196, 207–08 (1910) (invalidating an order compelling construction of sidetracks to serve private grain elevators because it takes
the railroad’s property without compensation); Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co.
v. Cent. Stock Yards Co., 212 U.S. 132, 143–44 (1909) (invalidating a statute
requiring a railroad to deliver cars to another railway line as an “unlawful
taking of its property” violating due process); Missouri Pac. I, 164 U.S. 403,
417 (1896) (invalidating an order authorizing construction of a private grain
elevator on railroad right-of-way as “a taking of private property of the railroad corporation, for the private use of the petitioners” and “not due process of
law”). In contrast, when the Court perceived a strong public interest at stake,
it upheld redistributive regulations. See, e.g., Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v.
Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 250 (1922) (upholding state wartime rent control laws
similar to those in Block v. Hirsh); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921)
(“All the elements of a public interest justifying some degree of public control
are present” in emergency wartime rent control legislation, and the regulation
does not “go[ ] too far” to be sustained as a reasonable police power measure).
207. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE 244 (1973) (quoting
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 108–09 (Mark de Wolfe Howe, ed., 1941)).
208. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414; cf. Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 512
(1922) (Kephardt, J., dissenting) (“If the Legislature had desired to protect life
and limb it could have required a notice . . . . [but] the real purpose of the Legislature and the framers of the act was in the interest of property, and property alone—not to prevent the ‘terrible menace to human life, public safety
and morals.’”), rev’d, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
209. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414.
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For Holmes, the determination whether a police power justification is sufficiently robust to support the challenged regulation is not susceptible to a simple, categorical “yes or no” answer. Instead, Holmes says, it is a “question of degree” and
“cannot be disposed of by general propositions,”210 requiring a
case-specific balancing of the “public interest” advanced by the
regulation against the burden imposed on private parties.
Weighing the relevant factors in Mahon, Holmes concludes that
the public interest in protecting surface owners who lacked the
foresight to protect themselves is slight and easily outweighed
by the substantial burden on subsurface coal owners. Consequently, the police power rationale fails Holmes’s balancing
test.211
Boiled to its core, the holding in Mahon was simply that
the Kohler Act “cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police
power”212 and violated the Fourteenth Amendment due process
guarantee. Although the Act might be justified as an exercise of
eminent domain,213 that would require just compensation.214
Even with respect to its sliding-scale methodology, however, Mahon was no pathbreaker. Holmes had outlined this approach fifteen years earlier in Martin v. District of Columbia
(1907):
[T]here should not be extracted from the very general language of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a system of delusive exactness and merely
logical form . . . . Constitutional rights like others are matters of degree. To illustrate: Under the police power, in its strict sense, a certain limit might be set to the height of buildings without compensa-

210. Id. at 416; see also BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 207, at 134 (“[I]n
Justice Holmes’ view the difference between regulation and taking was one of
degree not kind.”).
211. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 207, at 139 (describing Holmes’s
approach as a “balancing test”); Treanor, supra note 25, at 857.
212. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414 (“It is our opinion that the act cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police power, so far as it affects the mining of coal
under streets or cities in places where the right to mine such coal has been reserved.”).
213. Id. at 416 (“We assume, of course, that the statute was passed upon
the conviction that an exigency existed that would warrant it, and we assume
that an exigency exists that would warrant the exercise of eminent domain.”).
214. Id. at 415 (“The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment
presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be
taken for such use without compensation. A similar assumption is made in the
decisions upon the Fourteenth Amendment.”); id. at 416 (“[A] strong public
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”).
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tion; but to make that limit five feet would require compensation and
a taking by eminent domain.215

Amplifying his views in Hudson County Water Co. v.
McCarter, Holmes argued that case-by-case balancing should
be constrained not by abstract principles but by the incremental accumulation of constitutional precedents which would
provide benchmarks and guideposts in the manner of the common law:
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme.
Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy
which are other than those on which the particular right is founded,
and which become strong enough to hold their own when a certain
point is reached. The limits set to property by other public interests
present themselves as a branch of what is called the police power of
the state. The boundary at which the conflicting interests balance
cannot be determined by any general formula in advance, but points
in the line, or helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions that this
or that concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side.216

In Noble State Bank v. Haskell, Holmes stressed the antiformalism of his approach:
[W]e must be cautious about pressing the broad words of the Fourteenth Amendment to a drily logical extreme. Many laws which it
would be vain to ask the court to overthrow could be shown, easily
enough, to transgress a scholastic interpretation of one or another of
the great guarantees in the Bill of Rights. They more or less limit the
liberty of the individual or they diminish property to a certain extent.
We have few scientifically certain criteria of legislation, and as it often is difficult to mark the line where what is called the police power
of the States is limited by the Constitution of the United States,
judges should be slow to read into the latter a nolumus mutare as
against the law-making power.217

215. Martin v. District of Columbia, 205 U.S. 135, 139 (1907); see also Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 86–87 (1907) (upholding a Massachusetts statute mandating half-price streetcar fares for school
children). Bosselman, Callies, and Banta trace Holmes’s balancing approach to
the 1889 Massachusetts case Rideout v. Knox, see BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra
note 207, at 124–25, where Holmes wrote in upholding a regulation limiting
the height of yard fences:
It may be said that the difference is only one of degree; most differences are when nicely analyzed. At any rate, difference of degree is
one of the distinctions by which the right of the legislature to exercise
police power is determined. Some small limitations of previously existing rights incident to property may be imposed for the sake of preventing manifest evil; larger ones could not be except by the exercise
of the right of eminent domain.
Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 368, 372 (Mass. 1889).
216. 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (upholding a New Jersey statute prohibiting
exports of fresh water).
217. 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911); see also Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342
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Holmes’s balancing approach to substantive due process
adjudication had gained some traction in the Court in the years
leading up to Mahon. In Eubank v. City of Richmond,218 for example, Justice McKenna cited Holmes’s opinions in Noble State
Bank and Hudson County Water Co. for the proposition that
the police power “necessarily . . . has its limits and must stop
when it encounters the prohibitions of the Constitution,” but
the “point where particular interests or principles balance ‘cannot be determined by any general formula in advance.’”219 Similar are Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Truax v. Corrigan220 and
Justice Brown’s opinion for a unanimous court in Camfield v.
United States.221
Holmes himself later placed Mahon in this procession of
substantive due process cases turning on the limits of the police
power. Dissenting in Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad
Commission, Holmes wrote:
The only valuable significance of the much abused phrase police
power is this power of the State to limit what otherwise would be
rights having a pecuniary value, when a predominant public interest
requires the restraint. The power of the State is limited in its turn by
the constitutional guaranties of private rights, and it often is a delicate matter to decide which interest preponderates and how far the
State may go without making compensation. The line cannot be
drawn by generalities, but successive points in it must be fixed by
weighing the particular facts. Extreme cases on the one side and on
the other are Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel and Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon.222
(1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (warning of the “dangers of a delusive exactness in the application of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
218. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
219. Id. at 143 (invalidating an ordinance empowering two-thirds of property owners to establish building setback lines).
220. Truax, 257 U.S. at 356–57 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Whether a law
enacted in the exercise of the police power is justly subject to the charge of being unreasonable or arbitrary, can ordinarily be determined only by a consideration of contemporary conditions [and] involves a weighing of public needs
as against private desires and likewise a weighing of relative social values.”).
221. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897) (citing Holmes’s
opinion in Rideout v. Knox for the proposition that “the police power is not subject to any definite limitations, but is co-extensive with the necessities of the
case and the safeguard of the public interests”).
222. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 601 (1926)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Frost invalidated on substantive
due process grounds a statute conditioning the right of private contract carriers to use public highways on their submission to regulations applicable to
common carriers. Id. at 599. Holmes found the statute “well within the legislative power,” id. at 601 (Holmes, J., dissenting), falling between the police
power “extremes” of Mahon and Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co., 258 U.S. 242
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What of Holmes’s famous epigram that “while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far
it will be recognized as a taking”?223 Viewing Mahon in historical context, this statement merely reiterates, in Holmes’s colorful language, the principle Mugler had articulated decades earlier:
It belongs to . . . [the legislature] to exert what are known as the police powers of the State . . . .
It does not at all follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for
the promotion of these ends is to be accepted as a legitimate exertion
of the police powers of the State. There are, of necessity, limits beyond
which legislation cannot rightfully go. While every possible presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of a statute, the courts
must obey the Constitution . . . and . . . determine whether, in any
particular case, these limits have been passed.224

Or, as the Court said in Lochner v. New York,
[T]here is a limit to the valid exercise of the police power by the State
. . . . Otherwise, the 14th Amendment would have no efficacy . . . .
[T]he question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual . . . ?225

Holmes made the same point in Block v. Hirsh—pre-dating
Mahon by two years—when he said that under the police power
“property rights may be cut down, and to that extent taken,
without pay”226 but it is “open to debate . . . whether the statute
goes too far. For just as there comes a point at which the police
power ceases and leaves only that of eminent domain
. . . regulations of the present sort [if] pressed to a certain
height might amount to a taking without due process of law.”227
Notwithstanding its latter-day reinterpreters, Mahon did
not hold that a valid police power regulation was a compensable
Fifth Amendment taking if it “went too far.” Instead, it used a
balancing test to plumb the outer bounds of the police power it(1922), which upheld wartime emergency rent control laws.
223. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
224. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136–37 (1894) (“The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily
interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is
a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to
the supervision of the courts.”).
225. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
226. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921).
227. Id. at 156.
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self—or as a contemporaneous commentator put it, to determine the “reasonableness” of the legislative enactment,228 a
classic substantive due process inquiry. The principle that a
valid police power regulation was not compensable clearly survived Mahon, as the Court quickly made plain in subsequent
cases,229 and as lower federal courts230 and state courts231 continued to hold.
It should not be surprising, then, that prior to Penn Central, Mahon was understood neither to have launched a doctrinal revolution nor, as a Fourteenth Amendment due process
case concerning the limits of the states’ police power, to have
much relevance to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.

228. See Thomas Reed Powell, Reasoning, Reasonableness and the Pennsylvania Surface Subsidence Case, 1 N.Y. L. REV. 242, 242–43 (1923) (characterizing Holmes’s disagreement with Brandeis in Mahon as a “struggle between
reasoning and reasonableness,” with Brandeis reasoning from abstract principles and Holmes viewing reasonableness as a “question . . . of degree”).
229. See, e.g., United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 284
(1943) (“A state may of course destroy or diminish values by an assertion of its
police power without the necessity of making compensation for the loss.”); New
Orleans Pub. Serv. v. City of New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682, 687 (1930) (“It is
elementary that enforcement of uncompensated obedience to a regulation
passed in the legitimate exertion of the police power is not a taking of property
without due process of law.”).
230. See, e.g., Marrs v. City of Oxford, 32 F.2d 134, 138–39 (8th Cir. 1929)
(reiterating that “uncompensated obedience to a legitimate regulation established under the police power is not a taking of property without compensation, or without due process” but “[a]rbitrary and unreasonable regulations . . .
will be stayed”); City of New York v. Davis, 7 F.2d 566, 572 (2d Cir. 1925)
(stating that “where the property of any person is taken under the eminent
domain power, whatever is taken must be paid for; but that doctrine is not applied to a taking under the police power” under which “property rights may be
cut down, and to that extent taken, without compensation”).
231. See, e.g., Blancett v. Montgomery, 398 S.W.2d 877, 881 (Ky. 1966)
(underscoring the proposition that “a valid exercise of the police power resulting in an expense or loss of property is not a taking of property without due
process of law or without just compensation” under the federal constitution);
N.M. Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry v. Roberts, 370 P.2d 811, 816 (N.M. 1962)
(“[P]roperty and property rights are held subject to the fair exercise of the police power and a reasonable regulation enacted [under that power] . . . is not
[an] unconstitutional ‘taking of property’ . . . [under] the Federal Constitution.”); Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 73 S.W.2d 475, 478–79 (Tex. 1934) (explaining that “[a]ll property is held subject to the valid exercise of the police
power” and “compensation is not required to be made for such loss as is occasioned by the proper exercise of the police power” (quotations omitted)).
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III. PHANTOM INCORPORATION AND
THE MAKING OF THE MUDDLE
A. THE NONARGUMENT IN PENN CENTRAL
Penn Central came to the Supreme Court as it was decided
in the courts below: as a Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process case, determining how far the police power legitimately allowed the state to go in adjusting the boundaries of
property rights. While intimating that the case might be a close
call, both the New York Appellate Division and the New York
Court of Appeals had upheld New York City’s landmark preservation ordinance as a valid police power regulation, constitutionally permissible under due process doctrine.232 On appeal to
the U.S. Supreme Court, appellee New York City continued to
argue the case on Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process grounds.233
Appellant Penn Central took a different tack. Although
stating that it sought injunctive relief and money damages to
remedy a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation,234
Penn Central relied heavily on Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause precedents involving the federal government.235 Perhaps recognizing the weakness of its position, Penn Central
relegated its incorporation claim to a single brief footnote
where it stated in conclusory fashion, without support or analy232. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E. 1271, 1273
(N.Y. 1977) (“[T]he regulation does not deprive plaintiffs of property without
due process of law, and should be upheld as a valid exercise of the police
power.”); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20, 27, 29
(N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (stating that “the line between a compensable ‘taking’
and a noncompensable ‘regulation’ is sometimes difficult to discern” but “New
York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law is a valid exercise of its police
power”).
233. New York City’s brief argued that the Landmarks Ordinance was a
valid police power regulation, therefore not compensable under due process
precedents like Goldblatt, Hadacheck, Euclid, and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas. See Brief for Appellees at 20–40, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (No. 77-444), 1978 WL 206883.
234. See Brief for Appellants at 12 n.10, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (No. 74-444), 1978 WL 206882 (“Penn Central
argues here that the City of New York’s action violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”); id. at 6 (stating that Penn Central
sought “equitable relief and monetary damages, alleging, inter alia, that the
actions of the Landmarks Commission . . . constituted a taking of private
property without just compensation in violation of due process and equal protection of the laws”).
235. Id. at 12–43.
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sis, that Chicago B & Q had established that “the constitutional protections” of the Due Process and Takings Clauses “are
the same.”236
In the alternative, Penn Central argued in the same footnote that the “same result”—the identity of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process and Fifth Amendment Takings
Clauses—“is reached under the ‘incorporation doctrine.’”237 For
this proposition it cited not Chicago B & Q, but Gideon v.
Wainwright, the 1963 case that extended the constitutional
right to counsel to state criminal proceedings.238 Gideon had
indeed made a passing reference to Chicago B & Q as a rough
prototype for expansion of due process to include other “fundamental” rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.239 But the
precedent that the Penn Central brief mustered for its incorporation argument was meager and indirect, and discussion of the
broader implications of such a holding entirely absent.
Neither New York City nor the states of New York and
California as amici mounted a serious response to the railroad’s
incorporation argument,240 which must have seemed farfetched under established property doctrines. At times, the city
and state briefs professed astonishment at Penn Central’s brazen disregard of applicable Fourteenth Amendment due process
precedents241 and its seemingly misplaced reliance on Fifth
236. Id. at 12 & n.10.
237. Id.
238. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
239. Id. at 341–42 (“[T]hough not always in precisely the same terminology, the Court has made obligatory on the States the Fifth Amendment’s
command that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation . . . .”).
240. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 233, at 20–39 (arguing that the
City’s action “did not deprive the owner of due process” because the Landmarks Ordinance was a legitimate police power exercise); Brief of the State of
New York as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (No. 77-444), 1978 WL 206891; Brief of
Amicus State of California as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (No. 77-444), 1978
WL 206888.
241. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 233, at 22 (“This Court has established a substantial body of precedent setting forth the appropriate criteria for
determining whether a land use regulation is a valid exercise of the police
power.”); Brief for the State of New York as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, supra note 240, at 17 (“Recognizing the extreme nature of their position,
appellants seek to paint this case as one in which a different rule for landmarks [than for other police power regulations] is established. But that is not
the case. The City’s law is valid under the traditional police power rules
within which this Court has steered for decades.”).
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Amendment Takings Clause precedents, dismissing Penn Central’s arguments as “confused,” “unwarranted,” “misleading,”
“blatantly ignor[ing]” relevant precedent, constructed on a
“faulty . . . premise,” and “irrelevan[t].”242 In the main, however, the city and states relied on standard Fourteenth
Amendment arguments and canonical due process precedents
to argue that the landmarks ordinance was a valid police power
measure.243 None of the parties or amici discussed the larger
implications of the sweeping incorporation holding the Penn
Central Court ultimately would make.
What is perhaps most puzzling about the Penn Central decision is how casually it swept away a century of Fourteenth
Amendment due process jurisprudence, seeming not to entertain seriously the possibility that the case should be decided—
as it was decided in the courts below, and as the parties had
argued it—on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds.
Nor did the Court pause to consider the possibility that what
counted as a “taking” of property by a state without due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment might differ from what
counted as a “taking” of property by the federal government
under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, as had long been
assumed.
Instead, almost sua sponte—without briefing on the incorporation question or prior adjudication of that issue in the
lower courts—Penn Central collapsed a century of substantive
due process precedent into Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
doctrine, indiscriminately lifting concepts and principles from
both lines of cases and weaving them into a new, unified “regu242. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees, supra note 233, at 21 (“[A]ppellants have
improperly confused the principles of eminent domain . . . with principles governing a lawful exercise of the police power.”); Brief for the State of New York
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, supra note 240, at 17 (“[A]ppellants’
portrayal of this as a ‘taking’ case, as if it were eminent domain, is unwarranted and misleading.”); id. at 21 (“The last-ditch attempt to portray this as
an eminent domain case blatantly ignores the factual findings below and forty
years of decisions broadening the police power of the municipalities . . . .”);
Brief for the State of California as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, supra
note 240, at 4 (“Penn Central’s legal analysis flows from the premise that the
actions of New York City . . . constituted a taking of private property for public
use. . . . Once the faulty nature of that premise is recognized, the irrelevance of
much of Penn Central’s argument becomes apparent.”).
243. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 233, at 16 (“The appellants, without any analysis, have argued that the City of New York . . . has taken their
property and must pay the appellants compensation . . . . It is our position that
the designation of Grand Central Terminal as a landmark was a proper exercise of the police power.”).
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latory takings” doctrine applicable to the states and the federal
government alike.244 Henceforth, all takings adjudication would
apply the text of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to the
facts at hand, requiring endless judicial parsing of the opaque
constitutional terms “take” and “taking.” Lost in the shuffle
was the notion, well understood by the courts of the substantive
due process era, that as a logically prior question, before one
could decide whether a claimant’s property was “taken,” it was
necessary to ascertain whether the claimant’s property rights
extended as far as claimed; and that depended crucially upon
state law and the state’s reserved police power to alter such law
within reasonable limits.
B. THE LONG MARCH TO INCORPORATION
How could the Penn Central Court have made such an
egregious blunder? Had Chicago B & Q already been transubstantiated into an incorporation case before Penn Central was
decided?
Eight decades of incorporation jurisprudence had passed
between Chicago B & Q and Penn Central, and in the latter
stages of that progression, Chicago B & Q came to be cited
regularly as a harbinger, progenitor, and early prototype of selective incorporation. But no Supreme Court decision prior to
Penn Central had actually held the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause applicable to the states. Nor had any majority Supreme
Court opinion ever squarely attributed that holding to Chicago
B & Q. Penn Central was wrong in its history. Penn Central,
not Chicago B & Q, was the defining moment when the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause was extended to the states.
The incorporation saga began at the turn of the twentieth
century with the first Justice John Marshall Harlan, who argued that all the rights citizens held against the federal government under the Bill of Rights had been fully incorporated
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, either
as “privileges and immunities”245 or as “liberties” which may
244. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–28
(1978) (citing nine Fifth Amendment and nineteen Fourteenth Amendment
cases in deriving a takings balancing test applicable to both state and federal
governments).
245. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 606 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(“[P]rivileges and immunities embrace at least those expressly recognized by
the Constitution of the United States and placed beyond the power of Congress
to take away or impair.”). Justice Harlan advanced similar arguments in other
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not be “deprived” without due process.246 Harlan lost that debate.247 The incorporation idea would then lie dormant for four
decades, although the scope of Fourteenth Amendment due
process gradually expanded during this period to embrace principles cognate to some provisions of the Bill of Rights.248
The incorporation debate reemerged with full force in
Palko v. Connecticut, deciding whether due process barred a
state from subjecting a criminal defendant to double jeopardy.249 Palko stoutly reaffirmed that the Fifth Amendment “is
not directed to the states, but solely to the federal government,”250 rejecting the petitioner’s effort to revive Harlan’s
blanket incorporation thesis.251 Justice Cardozo’s majority opinion acknowledged, however, that certain “immunities that are
valid as against the federal government by force of the specific
pledges of particular amendments” had independently “been
found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus,
through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against
the states.”252
Palko thus echoed the view expressed earlier in Twining v.
New Jersey that if provisions of the Bill of Rights found parallels in Fourteenth Amendment due process, it was not because
the original amendments had been extended, but because the

cases. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 124–27 (1908) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
246. Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 614 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“When . . . the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the deprivation by any State of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, the intention was to prevent any State
from infringing the guaranties for the protection of life and liberty that had
already been guarded against infringement by the National Government.”).
247. See e.g., Twining, 211 U.S. at 113–14 (holding that neither the Privileges and Immunities Clause nor the Due Process Clause incorporate the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination against the states); Maxwell,
176 U.S. at 604–05 (holding the Fifth Amendment Clauses guaranteeing indictment by a grand jury and trial by jury are not applicable to the states either as “privileges and immunities” or as “due process of law”).
248. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom
of press); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (freedom of speech); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (free exercise of religion).
249. 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937).
250. Id. at 322.
251. Id. at 323 (rejecting petitioner’s contention that “[w]hatever would be
a violation of the original bill of rights . . . if done by the federal government is
now equally unlawful by force of the Fourteenth Amendment if done by a
state” by stating that “[t]here is no such general rule”).
252. Id. at 324–25.
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concept of due process so required.253 The Palko Court specifically included among these parallel but independent due process protections the Chicago B & Q principle that compensation
was required in eminent domain.254
A decade later, Justice Hugo Black tried unsuccessfully to
revive Harlan’s blanket incorporation theory. By a 5–4 majority
in Adamson v. California, the Court rejected blanket incorporation, holding that the “due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . does not draw all the rights of the federal Bill
of Rights under its protection.”255 In an influential concurrence,
Justice Frankfurter argued that the Fourteenth Amendment
“neither comprehends the specific provisions by which the
founders deemed it appropriate to restrict the federal government nor is it confined to them.”256 Instead, Frankfurter
stressed, the Fourteenth Amendment has “independent potency” and an “independent function,”257 and is not merely “a
shorthand summary of the first eight amendments” for it
“would be extraordinarily strange for a Constitution to convey
such specific commands in such a roundabout and inexplicit
way.”258
By the 1960s, when the Court’s pro-incorporation wing began to gain the upper hand, their success was not predicated
upon blanket incorporation. Instead, they pressed for patient,
piecemeal expansion of the list of “fundamental rights” protected by Fourteenth Amendment due process, coupling those
incremental victories with a rhetorical turn to the original Bill
of Rights to inform their understanding of the specific content
of the new Fourteenth Amendment rights. This approach came
to be known as “selective incorporation.”259
253. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) (stating that if
“some of the personal rights” guaranteed against federal action by the first
eight amendments were also protected against state action by due process, “it
is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but
because they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of
due process of law”).
254. 302 U.S. at 326 & n.4 (quoting Twining, 211 U.S. at 99).
255. 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947); cf. id. at 71–72 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing
that “one of the chief objects” of the Fourteenth Amendment was to overturn
Barron and “make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states”).
256. 332 U.S. at 66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
257. Id. at 66–67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
258. Id. at 62–63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
259. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, “Selective Incorporation” in the Fourteenth
Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963) (outlining the origins and implications of
selective incorporation).
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With the rise of selective incorporation, citations to Chicago B & Q became almost obligatory. In every case, win or
lose, pro-incorporation justices would recite the growing list of
“fundamental rights” protected by due process and their cognates in the Bill of Rights; the right to just compensation was
prominent on every such list by virtue of its durable years of
service.260 These rote citations to Chicago B & Q were, however, merely dicta.
Most references to Chicago B & Q during this period display a profound (and perhaps intentional) ambiguity as to exactly what that case meant, and what it implied about the relation of the Fifth Amendment to the Fourteenth. Duncan v.
Louisiana, for example, said that the Court “increasingly
looked to the Bill of Rights for guidance” to determine “the
meaning” of Fourteenth Amendment due process, and that
“many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight Amendments
to the Constitution have been held to be protected against state
action by the Due Process Clause,” including “the right to compensation for property taken by the State.”261 That proposition
is decidedly ambiguous, however, as to whether the Takings
Clause now literally applied to the states (as Penn Central
would later hold), or whether the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment requirements were still understood as separate,
independent, parallel, and cognate, but possibly nonidentical
guarantees, as per earlier understandings.262
260. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 412 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); City of El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 534 (1965) (Black, J. dissenting); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 4 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963); Cohen v.
Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 155 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
261. 391 U.S. at 148. The citation to Chicago B & Q was curious in this
context, for at no point had the Chicago B & Q Court “looked . . . to the Bill of
Rights for guidance.” See id.
262. A similar ambiguity enshrouds characterizations of Chicago B & Q in,
for example, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488 (1965) (stating that
“the Fourteenth Amendment absorbs and applies to the States those specifics
of the first eight amendments which express fundamental personal rights”)
and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341–42 (1963) (stating that “the
Court ha[d] made obligatory on the States the Fifth Amendment’s command
that private property shall not be taken without just compensation”). Less
ambiguous was Justice Black’s opinion, expressing his views alone in announcing the judgment of a fractured Court in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112 (1970). Justice Black, citing Chicago B & Q, placed the Takings Clause
among “those protections of the Bill of Rights which we have held the Fourteenth Amendment made applicable to the States.” Id. at 129. However, that
citation represented the views of a single justice in a long string cite with no
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Pro-incorporation Justices occasionally made bolder claims
about Chicago B & Q’s meaning and effect in separate concurrences and dissents, but these had limited precedential value.
In Martin v. Creasy, Justice Douglas cited Chicago B & Q in his
dissent from the Court’s dismissal of a due process property
deprivation claim for failure to exhaust state remedies, arguing
that “these property owners are entitled to a declaratory judgment” determining whether they had suffered a property deprivation “compensable under the Fifth Amendment (and made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth).”263 Other Justices took similar positions in other cases.264
Then along came Penn Central. Justice Brennan, writing
for the Court, led off his opinion with a flat pro-incorporation
holding, buttressing it with the usual citation to Chicago B &
Q. No dissent pointed out the import of that holding; indeed,
the dissenters agreed with the majority on the incorporation
question.265 It is not clear whether by this time the Court had
come to believe its own rhetoric under the steady drumbeat of
nearly two decades of dissents and concurrences hailing Chicago B & Q as an incorporation case, or whether instead Justice Brennan’s one-line disposition of the heretofore unresolved
incorporation issue represented a sly piece of doctrinal legerdemain. Perhaps in the end it does not matter. What does matter is that the Penn Central Court squarely held for the first
time that “the Fifth Amendment . . . is made applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment,”266 citing Chicago
B & Q as its sole support.

analysis to support its interpretation. See id. It was also pure dicta, a clue to
the Court’s emerging mode of analysis, but nonetheless unnecessary to the
disposition of a case concerning the constitutionality of a federal statute establishing a national voting age of eighteen.
263. Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219, 226 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
264. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (“Thus the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees against infringement by the States the liberties of . . . the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117,
155 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that Chicago B & Q “in fact if not
in terms, applied the Fifth Amendment’s just-compensation requirement to
the States”).
265. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 141 n.3
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause is “applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment”).
266. Id. at 122 (majority opinion).
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C. MUDDLE ON ALL FRONTS
Conflation of substantive due process and Takings Clause
doctrine muddled the “takings” issue in multiple ways. First, it
introduced confusion as to what counts as precedent in Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause cases. Recently in Lingle v. Chevron, the Court admitted that its Takings Clause jurisprudence
had gone astray in Agins v. Tiburon, when it said that a challenged regulation would be a Fifth Amendment taking if it did
not “substantially advance [a] legitimate [governmental] interes[t].”267 That test, Lingle explained, is more appropriate to
a substantive due process inquiry, and was derived from misplaced reliance on two early twentieth-century substantive due
process precedents, Nectow v. City of Cambridge268 and Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.269
The dirty little secret that Lingle did not address, however,
is that the Court had relied on Nectow and Village of Euclid,
together with their now-discredited derivative Agins, in most of
the foundational Fifth Amendment takings cases of the modern
era, from Penn Central270 through Loretto,271 Nollan,272 Lucas,273 Dolan,274 and Tahoe-Sierra,275 as well as numerous less
celebrated cases.276 For its part, the errant Agins “substantially
advances” formula has profoundly influenced the course of takings jurisprudence, having been cited in hundreds of federal
and state cases over the last twenty-five years.277
267. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2087 (2005) (quoting
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
268. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
269. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
270. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125, 131.
271. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
447 (1982).
272. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834–35 (1987).
273. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016, 1024 (1992).
274. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384–85, 387, 391 n.8 (1994).
275. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 323, 334 (2002).
276. See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 234 (2003); E.
Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 544, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645
(1993); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488
(1987); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126
(1985); Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 15 (1984).
277. Westlaw’s KeyCite service lists 923 court citations to Agins before it
was overruled by Lingle on May 23, 2005. Search of WESTLAW, Keycite service
(Jan. 25, 2006).
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Nor does the problem of misplaced reliance on substantive
due process precedents end with Nectow, Village of Euclid, and
their bastard child Agins. Other notable Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process cases like Mugler,278 Reinman,279
Hadacheck,280 and Miller v. Schoene281 make frequent cameo
appearances in modern takings adjudication, cast as Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause precedents.
Not all substantive due process precedents are afforded
this privileged treatment, however. The Court selectively cites
language that, stripped from its proper Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process context, appears to support elements of
current Takings Clause doctrine, while ignoring the language
and holdings of other substantive due process cases, or other
parts of the very same cases the Court cites. Chicago B & Q, for
example, is routinely misappropriated to stand for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause was made applicable to the states, but never for the companion holding,
equally important in its day, that a valid police power regulation never gives rise to a compensable taking.282 Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon is regularly—and erroneously—invoked to
support the assertion that a valid police power regulation may
constitute a compensable taking,283 but more recent substan278. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), was cited as a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause precedent in, inter alia, Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1023, 1026
n.13; Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 489, 492; and Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 126 (1978).
279. Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915), was cited as a Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause precedent in, inter alia, Lucas, 505 U.S. at 102
n.13; Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 489–90; and Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at
126.
280. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), was cited as a Fifth
Amendment precedent in, inter alia, Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645; Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1023, 1026 n.13; and Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 489–90.
281. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), was cited as a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause precedent in, inter alia, Texaco, Inc v. Short, 454 U.S.
516, 530 n.23 (1982); and Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125–26.
282. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
251–52 (1897) (stating that “[t]he requirement that compensation be made for
private property taken for public use imposes no restriction upon the inherent
power of the State by reasonable regulations to protect the lives and secure
the safety of the people” and that any property damaged or diminished in
value by such regulations “is not, within the meaning of the Constitution,
taken for public use, nor is the owner deprived of it without due process of
law”).
283. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 853 (1987)
(“The fact that the Commission’s action is a legitimate exercise of the police
power does not, of course, insulate it from a takings challenge.” (citing Pa.
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tive due process cases expressly holding to the contrary are ignored.284
Misplaced reliance on substantive due process precedent
pervasively infects contemporary Fifth Amendment regulatory
takings doctrine with substantive due process concepts and
principles. Again, the problem extends well beyond Agins. Penn
Central relied on no fewer than twenty substantive due process
precedents, including Nectow and Village of Euclid, to conclude
that “a use restriction on real property may constitute a ‘taking’
if not reasonably necessary to effectuation of a substantial public purpose.”285 That standard, like the repudiated prong of
Agins, sounds in substantive due process,286 and is almost indistinguishable from the Agins “substantially advances” formulation.287 Taking root as part of the “character of the government action” element of the Penn Central balancing test—a test
the Court applies in all but a few exceptional categories of takings inquiries288—this formulation has become a touchstone of
Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922))); Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes,
904 F.2d 585, 587 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[R]egulation may meet the standards necessary for exercise of police power but still result in a compensable taking.”
(citing Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414)).
284. See supra note 229.
285. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 127. The Court cited Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977), and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) in immediate
support of the quoted proposition, and Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad
Co. v. Public Utility Commission, 346 U.S. 346 (1953), Chicago Burlington &
Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), Demorest v. City
Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36 (1944), City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926), Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927), Griggs v. Allegheny
County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915),
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908), Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272 (1928), Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), Muhlker v. New
York & Harlem Railroad Co., 197 U.S. 544 (1905), Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171
(1915), Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), Walls v. Midland
Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920), and Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909), in
close proximity.
286. The Penn Central court cited no Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
precedents in support of the quoted proposition, which had no history in Takings Clause doctrine.
287. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 843–44 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (equating
the Agins “substantially advances” test to the Penn Central “reasonably necessary” standard, stating that although “[o]ur phraseology may differ slightly
from case to case,” the “inquiry in each case is the same”).
288. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2005) (stating that the Penn Central balancing test applies in all regulatory takings cases
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modern Fifth Amendment Takings Clause jurisprudence.289
Indeed, the Penn Central balancing test itself, cobbled
largely out of substantive due process precedents, bears an uncanny resemblance to Holmes’s sliding-scale balancing test in
substantive due process analysis. Penn Central instructs courts
to weigh the “character of the government action”—the “public
interest,” in Holmes’s formulation290—against the economic
burden on the property owner, taking into account “distinct investment-backed expectations”—or the “private interest,” in
Holmesian language.291 On either test, a regulation that “goes
too far” as measured in the balance will run afoul of one or another constitutional property guarantee; for the modern Court
it is a Fifth Amendment regulatory taking, while for Holmes it
was an “unreasonable” regulation beyond the legitimate scope
of the police power.292
The modern Court’s misplaced reliance on Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon as precedent for a “diminution of value” test
in Fifth Amendment takings doctrine has produced further doctrinal confusion.293 This misreading of Mahon led the Penn
Central court to incorporate the diminution of value standard
into its balancing test for Fifth Amendment takings: both the
“burden” and “investment-backed expectations” prongs of the
three-part Penn Central balance reflect “diminution of value”
concepts.294
except the “relatively narrow categories” of Loretto-type permanent physical
occupations and Lucas-type “total regulatory takings,” and the “special context” of land use exactions governed by Nollan and Dolan).
289. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633–34 (2001)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (incorporating a “reasonably necessary” test into the
“character of the governmental action” prong of Penn Central balancing); accord Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 643, 659 (2003);
Qwest Corp. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 672, 688–89 (2001); see also Dodd v.
Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 1998) (incorporating the
Agins “substantially advances” test into the “character of the governmental
action” prong of Penn Central balancing); Ga. Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of
Waynesville, 900 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1990) (same).
290. See supra notes 202–11 and accompanying text.
291. See id.
292. See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text.
293. See supra Part II.E (arguing that Mahon employed a balancing test,
not a simple diminution-of-value test, and was a substantive due process case
turning on the legitimate scope of the police power, not a Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause case).
294. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127
(1978) (citing Mahon as the “leading case” establishing that frustration of “distinct investment-backed expectations” is relevant to a takings inquiry); id. at
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The Mahon-misbegotten “diminution of value” test was
also foundational to the second (and presumptively still valid)
prong of Agins, holding that a regulation that “denies an owner
economically viable use of his land” is a taking.295 Mahon and
Agins, in turn, provided the conceptual and doctrinal foundations for the Lucas “total taking” test, a test based purely on
diminution of value without regard to the character or importance of the governmental action.296
Finally, misplaced reliance on substantive due process
precedents led to the importation of substantive due process
standards into the Nollan “essential nexus” and Dolan “rough
proportionality” tests for exactions. Nollan’s “essential nexus”
holding—requiring that a “permit condition serves the same
governmental purpose as the development ban” it is designed to
avoid297—was derived directly from the discredited Agins’s
“substantially advances” test and its Penn Central “reasonably
necessary” counterpart.298 Similarly, Dolan’s “rough proportionality” test was derived from the defective “substantially advances” prong of Agins,299 the parallel “reasonably necessary”
language in Penn Central,300 and the Dolan Court’s own syn124 (attributing “economic impact of the regulation on the claimant” and “interfer[ence] with distinct investment-backed expectations” standards to a passage in Goldblatt that cites Mahon (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962))). The “diminution of value” test had no precedent in
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause doctrine.
295. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
296. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014–16 (1992) (citing Mahon for the proposition that diminution of value can lead to a taking,
and Agins for the proposition that “where regulation denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land” it will be deemed a categorical taking).
297. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
298. Id. at 834–35 (citing Agins’s “substantially advances” and Penn Central’s “reasonably necessary” formulations for the proposition that the Takings
Clause demands means-end rationality, but stating that “[o]ur cases have not
elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a ‘legitimate
state interest’ or what type of connection between the regulation and the state
interest satisfies the requirement that the former ‘substantially advance’ the
latter”); id. at 837 (concluding that “the lack of nexus” between the permit
condition and the original purpose of the regulation “converts that purpose to
something other than it was” and therefore falls beyond the “outer limits of
‘legitimate state interests’”).
299. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384–85 (1994) (citing
Agins’s “substantially advances” test along with Euclid and Mahon).
300. Id. at 388 (citing Nollan’s and Penn Central’s “reasonably necessary”
formulation for the proposition that takings analysis “requires us to determine
whether the degree of the exactions demanded bears the required relationship
to the projected impact of petitioner’s proposed development”).
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thesis of state court precedents, most based on state constitutional provisions301 and many sounding in substantive due
process.302 At the end of the day, both the Nollan “essential
nexus” and Dolan “rough proportionality” inquiries demand a
tight means-end “fit” in exactions, echoing the heightened substantive due process standards of an earlier era from which
these modern standards are derived.
Thus it fairly may be said that every major element in the
Court’s modern Fifth Amendment regulatory takings jurisprudence, with the possible exception of Loretto,303 was founded in
whole or in part on Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process precedents, and reflects substantive due process concepts and principles. Penn Central’s phantom incorporation of
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause against the states effected, in fact though not in name, a “reverse incorporation” of
Lochner-era substantive due process jurisprudence into modern
Fifth Amendment takings law.
The reverse incorporation was a selective one, however.
Even as it imported heightened substantive due process review
of economic regulations affecting property into modern Fifth
Amendment takings doctrine, the doctrinal merger stripped
states of what had been their most important defense in the
substantive due process era. The police power, operating as an
inherent limitation on property rights, gave states ample room
301. See id. at 388–91 (citing thirteen state court precedents to support the
holding that the “city must make some sort of individualized determination
that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact
of the proposed development,” a test it denominated “rough proportionality”);
Simpson v. City of N. Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Neb. 1980) (citing to state
constitution); Jenad, Inc. v. Vill. of Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966)
(holding that a development impact fee was permissible under the state constitution).
302. See, e.g., McKain v. Toledo Planning Comm’n, 270 N.E.2d 370, 373–74
(Ohio Ct. App. 1971) (finding that a required dedication for highway improvements unrelated to the proposed development is not a reasonable police power
measure, and violates the state constitution); Billings Props., Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182, 188 (Mont. 1964) (ruling that a statute requiring
dedicated park land was a reasonable and constitutionally permissible exercise of police power); Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Vill. of Mount Prospect,
176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961) (finding that a dedication where the impact is
not “specifically and uniquely attributable” to a developer is not a reasonable
exercise of police power).
303. Loretto cited primarily Fifth Amendment precedents but also relied
heavily on Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, an 1871 dam flooding case decided on state constitutional grounds. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982) (citing Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871)).
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to assert that new regulatory enactments had not deprived
claimants of their property because private property rights
simply ended where the states’ police power began. Misconstruing Mahon to have reversed that historic understanding, the
modern Court from Penn Central forward has insisted that
valid police power regulations could effect Fifth Amendment
regulatory takings, so the fact that a regulatory enactment is a
legitimate exercise of the state’s police power is no longer a defense.304 For states, then, “reverse incorporation” of substantive
due process into Fifth Amendment takings doctrine is a double
bind: it subjects regulatory enactments affecting property (but
no others) to heightened scrutiny akin to, and derived from,
Lochner-era substantive due process, but denies states their
most potent defense against such challenges.
The mischief does not end there. By collapsing the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process and Fifth Amendment Takings Clause branches of just compensation law into a
single doctrine revolving principally around concepts of diminution of value (Penn Central, Lucas, Agins prong two) and
means-end rationality (Penn Central, Agins prong one, Nollan,
Dolan), the modern Court has largely squeezed the law of property—and particularly the role of state law in defining, limiting, and modifying property rights over time—out of the equation. As Part II.D showed, prior to Penn Central courts
adjudicating Fifth Amendment takings claims against the federal government looked first to state law to determine the scope
and limits of the claimant’s property rights, as a logically necessary predicate for determining whether a challenged federal
action had so truncated a state-defined property right as to

304. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028–29 (1992)
(stating that Loretto held a permanent physical occupation compensable “no
matter how weighty the asserted ‘public interests’” and “similar treatment
must be accorded . . . regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use
of land”); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 853 (1987) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (citing Mahon for the proposition that “[t]he fact that the Commission’s action is a legitimate exercise of the police power does not . . . insulate it from a takings challenge”); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 425 (stating that even if
a statute is a valid police power measure, it is “a separate question . . .
whether an otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property rights that compensation must be paid”); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (citing Mahon as “the leading case for the proposition
that a state statute that substantially furthers important public policies may
so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a ‘taking’”).
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constitute a taking.305 State law was also central to Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process analyses, through a different route: the state’s usual defense was that because the
claimant’s property rights under state law were subject to the
police power limitation, the measure did not “take” any property.306 Through this mechanism, the precise boundaries of
state-recognized property rights would evolve over time.
In the modern era, state property law has all but disappeared from the inquiry. The analysis of a regulatory takings
claim typically begins by assuming that the claimant’s constitutionally protectable rights include the right to capture the
full fair market value of her economic expectations ex ante the
challenged regulatory enactment—though why such expectations should be deemed “property” is never made clear.307
Diminution of value measured against ex ante expectations becomes the gauge to determine whether the regulation “goes too
far” and is a compensable taking. On this approach, what is
“taken” need not even be “property” in a legal sense.
An example is Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel.308 Eastern Enterprises challenged a federal statute imposing retroactive liability on current coal operators to fund employee pension,
medical, and survivor benefits that were “orphaned” by previous industry closures and reorganizations.309 Applying a Penn
Central balancing analysis, Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion found the economic impact on Eastern Enterprises both
substantial310 and disproportionate to what the company could
have reasonably expected given its history as employer and
participant in previous benefit plans.311 Moreover, the plurality
said, the governmental action was suspect because it “singles
out certain employers” to bear a heavy economic burden for
“conduct far in the past” and “unrelated to any commitment the
employers made or any injury they caused.”312 On balance, the
305. See supra Part II.D.
306. See id.
307. Cf. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 207, at 240 (“The idea that a regulation of the use of land which prevents the owner from making money can
amount to a taking assumes that a landowner has a constitutional right to use
and develop his land for some purpose which will result in personal profit, regardless of the effect that such development will have on the public.”).
308. 524 U.S. 498 (1994).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 529.
311. Id. at 530–31.
312. Id. at 537.

KARKKAINEN_3FMT

2006]

04/20/2006 10:15:59 AM

THE POLICE POWER REVISITED

891

plurality said, the statute was a Fifth Amendment taking.313
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, said he
would reach the same result on substantive due process
grounds, pointing out that the plurality’s reasoning sounded
more like a substantive due process than a takings holding.314
Kennedy noted that although the statute imposed a “staggering
financial burden” on Eastern Enterprises, it “does not operate
upon or alter an identified property interest, and it is not applicable to or measured by a property interest”; instead, it merely
placed a financial obligation on the company which remained
free to meet that obligation by any means it chose.315 In short,
the only thing “taken” from Eastern Enterprises was some fraction of its total economic value, not any identifiable “property”
interest as defined by state law or any other law.
In other cases, the court issues solemn pronouncements on
the nature and content of “property,” but rarely are these
grounded in state law. Notwithstanding Erie v. Tompkins, the
court sometimes appears to rely on general federal common law
to inform its decisions. The Lucas Court’s suggestion that ancient background common law principles of public and private
nuisance stand as a singular exception to its otherwise categorical “total takings” rule is the best known example,316 but
other examples abound. Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation held that for purposes of takings analysis, interest earned
on Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) funds is the
property of the clients whose money is held in trust, making a
Texas statute assigning such interest to fund low-income legal
services a Fifth Amendment taking.317 The Court based this
holding on the background common law rule that “interest follows principal” which the Court dated to English law of the
mid-1700s, and which “has become firmly embedded in the
common law of the various States”—including Texas, the Court
313. Id.
314. Id. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting). A
strikingly similar case decided on substantive due process grounds is Railroad
Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935) (holding that
a mandatory industry-wide pension scheme making present employers liable
for employees of defunct carriers is arbitrary and unreasonable, violating Fifth
Amendment due process).
315. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 540; see also id. at 554 ( Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“This case involves not an interest in physical or intellectual property, but an
ordinary liability to pay money.”).
316. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.
317. 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
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said, notwithstanding that state’s specific statutory exception
for IOLTA funds.318 The Court acknowledged that the common
law rule was not absolute in Texas, which recognized exceptions for income-only trusts and marital community property;
but these exceptions, the Court said, “ha[ve] a firm basis in
traditional property law principles”319—that is to say, they had
passed into general common law by long practice. The IOLTA
exception, without an ancient pedigree in general property law,
was a Fifth Amendment taking.320
In another class of cases, the Court resorts to metaphysical
arguments concerning the essential characteristics of property
in general. An example is Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.321 When
Palazzolo took title to a seaside parcel, it was already subject to
state wetlands regulations that effectively barred most development.322 After repeated denials of development permits, Palazzolo brought a Fifth Amendment takings claim.323 The State
argued that Palazzolo should be precluded from challenging
regulations to which the parcel was already subject when he
acquired it, reasoning that he had not suffered any property
deprivation.324 The Court rejected the State’s defense, stating
that “some regulations are unreasonable and do not become
less so through passage of time or title.”325 The State’s proposed
rule, the Court reasoned, “would work a critical alteration to
the nature of property, as the newly regulated landowner is
stripped of the ability to transfer the interest which was possessed prior to the regulation,” and the “State may not by this
means secure a windfall to itself.”326 The Court, in short, implied that some changes in the law of property—including
modifications to the general rule that an owner of a fee simple
estate is entitled to transfer all of her present and future interest to another—so interfere with the essential nature of property itself that they are beyond the power of the state to make.

318. Id. at 165–66.
319. Id. at 167.
320. Id. at 168.
321. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
322. Id. at 614.
323. Id. at 614–15.
324. Id. at 626.
325. Id. at 627.
326. Id. at 627–28 (citing, inter alia, Robert Ellickson, Property in Land,
102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1368–69 (1993), for the proposition that the “right to
transfer interest in land is a defining characteristic of the fee simple estate”).
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More commonly, the court cites the “right to exclude” as
the defining, essential sine qua non of property. In Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, the Court held that imposition of a federal
navigational servitude on a privately owned pond effected a
compensable “taking” because it invaded the “right to exclude”
which is “so universally held . . . a fundamental element of the
property right” that it “falls within this category of interests
that the Government cannot take without compensation.”327
That view was echoed in Loretto, Nollan, and Dolan, all of
which rest substantially on the asserted “essentiality” of the
right to exclude as an irreducible core element of property
rights upon which the state is not permitted to intrude.328
IV. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE POLICE POWER:
WHAT WE’VE LOST
The police power was always a spongy, indefinite concept;
courts readily acknowledged that its uncertain contours could
never be fully specified. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
offered a typical account: “The line which in this field separates
the illegitimate assumption of power is not capable of precise
delimitation. It varies with circumstances and conditions.”329
Indeterminacy was both the police power’s greatest virtue
and its greatest vice. It left ample room for the law of property
to evolve in response to changing social needs, conditions, and
understandings. Ernst Freund explained that the police power
should be understood “not as a fixed quantity, but as the expression of social, economic and political conditions. As long as
these conditions vary, the police power must continue to be
elastic, i.e., capable of development.”330
More worryingly, indeterminacy left legislatures and property owners with ex ante uncertainty as to the ultimate scope of
property rights and the constitutionally permissible bounds of
the state’s reserved power to regulate. Legal uncertainty invited litigation,331 and left discretionary power in the hands of
327. 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979) (citations omitted).
328. The right to exclude was described as “one of the most essential sticks
in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property” in Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at
176). Accord Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 830 (1987); Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982).
329. 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
330. FREUND, supra note 148, at 3.
331. Cf. id. at 65 (“[T]here is hardly any important police legislation which
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judges to determine—on a case-by-case basis, without the aid of
clear rules or guiding principles—when a regulation “went too
far” and overstepped the bounds.
These problems were compounded by the conceptual trajectory of the police power itself. Early formulations narrowly emphasized the state’s power to supplement the retrospective doctrines of public and private nuisance with prophylactic
regulation to prevent nuisance-like injuries to other property
owners or the public generally, reflecting the common law
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedes.332 Chancellor Kent
urged in his Commentaries:
The government may, by general regulations, interdict such uses of
property as would create nuisances and become dangerous to the
lives, or health, or peace, or comfort of the citizens. Unwholesome
trades, slaughter-houses, operations offensive to the senses, the deposit of powder, the application of steam-power to propel cars, the
building with combustible materials, and the burial of the dead, may
all be interdicted by law, in the midst of dense masses of population,
on the general and rational principle that every person ought so to use
his property as not to injure his neighbors, and that private interests
must be made subservient to the general interests of the community.333

Kent’s view gained general adherence in antebellum property jurisprudence.334 Consequently, when the police power was
is not questioned in the Supreme Court as violating the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
332. See, e.g., Richmond, Frederickburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. City of
Richmond, 96 U.S. 521, 528 (1877) (stating that prohibitions on the use of locomotives in the public streets “clearly rest upon the maxim sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, which lies at the foundation of the police power”); Munn
v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124–25 (1876) (“[T]he establishment of laws requiring
each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his property, as not unnecessarily to injure another. . . . is the very essence of government, and has found expression in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedes. From this source
come the police powers . . . .”).
333. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 534 (John M.
Gould ed., 14th ed. 1896); see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 595–96 (1868) (listing examples of legitimate
police power exercises including restrictions on “[t]he keeping of gunpowder in
unsafe quantities in cities and villages, the sale of poisonous drugs, unless labeled [sic]; allowing unmuzzled dogs to be at large when danger of hydrophobia is apprehended; or the keeping for sale unwholesome provisions”).
334. See, e.g., Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216, 240 (1859) (holding that the
police power “is derived . . . from a principle of the common law older than
constitutions, and coeval with the earliest civilized ideas of property, namely,
that every man shall so use his own as not to injure another”); Baker v. City of
Boston, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 184, 194 (1831) (stating that the “[p]olice regulations to direct the use of private property so as to prevent its proving pernicious to the citizens at large, are not void, although they may in some measure
interfere with private rights without providing for compensation, [because]
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later absorbed into Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process doctrine, it arrived not as an artificially contrived “exception” to a general law of takings, but as part of a common
understanding that it was foundational to every state’s property law, central to the definition of property itself, and consequently was of central importance in the adjudication of claims
of unconstitutional interference with property rights.335
Over time, a catch-all category of “general welfare” was
added to “public health, safety, and morals” in the standard list
of legitimate police power purposes, and courts and commentators came to regard the police power as exceeding the narrow
bounds of nuisance prevention. Ernst Freund explained in
1904:
[M]ost of the self-evident limitations upon liberty and property in the
interest of peace, safety, health, order and morals are punishable at
common law as nuisances . . . . But no community confines its care of
the public welfare to the enforcement of the principles of the common
law. The state . . . exercises its compulsory powers for the prevention
and anticipation of wrong by narrowing common law rights through
conventional restraints and positive regulations which are not confined to the prohibition of wrongful acts. It is this latter kind of state
control which constitutes the essence of the police power.336

In the heyday of substantive due process, however, the
term “general welfare” was construed narrowly to mean “for the
mutual benefit of property owners generally”337 or “for the
every citizen holds his property subject to such regulations”); Coates v. Mayor
of New York, 7 Cow. 585, 585 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (upholding an ordinance
prohibiting interment of the dead in a portion of the city because it “stands on
the ground of being an authority to make police regulations in respect to nuisances,” and “[e]very right, from absolute ownership in property down to a
mere easement, is purchased and holden subject to the restriction that it shall
be so exercised as not to injure others”).
335. See, e.g., Cal. Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S.
306, 318 (1905) (stating that it is “firmly established in the jurisprudence of
this court that the States possess, because they have never surrendered, the
power . . . to prescribe such regulations as may be reasonable, necessary, and
appropriate for the protection of the public health, safety, and comfort” and
“persons and property are subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and general prosperity of the State”);
Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667 (1878) (stating that the police
power “belonged to the States when the Federal Constitution was adopted.
They did not surrender it, and they all have it now. It extends to the entire
property and business within their local jurisdiction.”).
336. FREUND, supra note 148, at 6.
337. See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 163
(1896) (“Statutes authorizing drainage of swamp lands have frequently been
upheld independently of any effect upon the public health, as reasonable regulations for the general advantage of those who are treated for this purpose as
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benefit of the entire public.”338 Importantly, the “general welfare” excluded “class legislation” redistributing rights or benefits from one person or class to another. The Court explained in
Barbier v. Connolly: “Class legislation, discriminating against
some and favoring others, is prohibited, but legislation which,
in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if
within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons
similarly situated” is constitutionally permissible.339 A decade
later in Lawton v. Steele, the Court elaborated:
To justify the State in thus interposing its [police power] authority in
behalf of the public, it must appear,—first, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.340

Later courts offered additional tests for determining the
legitimacy of an asserted police power measure. A regulation
would be presumed valid unless “arbitrary” or “unreasonable,”
or the means chosen bore no substantial relation to the end
sought.341 Under these restrictions, the police power, although

owners of a common property.”).
338. See, e.g., Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911) (ruling
that the police power “extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth
in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or
strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to
the public welfare,” such as “enforcing the primary conditions of successful
commerce” (citations omitted)); Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 318 (1907)
(holding that the police power is not confined “to the suppression of what is
offensive, disorderly or unsanitary,” but “extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the State as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of its
people”); Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Illinois ex rel Drainage
Comm’rs, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906) (“We hold that the police power of a State
embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to promote the public health,
the public morals or the public safety.”).
339. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885).
340. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
341. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 385 (1926)
(“[I]t must be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that
such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”); Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 355 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). (“[T]he statute
will not be declared a violation of the due process clause, unless the court finds
that the interference is arbitrary or unreasonable or that, considered as a
means, the measure has no real or substantial relation of cause to a permissible end.”).
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operating as an inherent limitation on property rights, also
“had its limits.”342
As the primary rubric under which due process claims of
alleged regulatory deprivations of property were analyzed, the
police power had real analytical bite. It both empowered the
state to regulate to achieve broad public-regarding purposes,
and simultaneously limited the scope of that power. A surprisingly large number and variety of regulations passed constitutional muster, even if they placed substantial economic burdens
on property owners.343 Yet the state could not assume that recitation of a police power justification would shield a regulatory
enactment from due process challenge. Many regulations were
held impermissible, either because the means did not exhibit a
sufficiently close “fit” with the alleged legislative purpose,344 or
because the scheme drew “arbitrary” distinctions,345 or burdened some for the private benefit of others,346 or because
courts deemed the police power justifications unreasonable, inadequate, irrational, or pretextual.347
342. Cf. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“[O]bviously the
implied limitation must have its limits or the contract and due process clauses
are gone.”); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (“There are, of necessity, limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go.”).
343. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962)
(upholding a prohibition on sand and gravel mining); Miller v. Schoene, 276
U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (upholding a statute requiring the destruction of diseasecarrying trees); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 609 (1927) (upholding building
setback requirements); Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (upholding a municipal
zoning ordinance); Erie R.R. Co. v. Bd. of Pub. Utils. Comm’rs, 254 U.S. 394,
410 (1921) (upholding a regulation requiring railroads to install costly grade
crossing improvements); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 408–09 (1915)
(upholding an ordinance prohibiting brickyards in residential zones, destroying much of the value of petitioner’s property); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91,
107 (1909) (upholding building height restrictions); Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661–
64 (upholding state prohibition on alcoholic beverages, making breweries virtually worthless).
344. Cf. Tyson & Bro.-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273
U.S. 418, 442 (1927) (invalidating a regulation of ticket brokers as “arbitrary
and unreasonable” because it was overinclusive).
345. See, e.g., Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 241 (1904)
(striking down municipal regulation of gasworks as “arbitrary and discriminatory”).
346. See, e.g., Truax, 257 U.S. at 333 (invalidating a statute immunizing
labor picketers against injunction as impermissible “class legislation” impairing business owners’ property rights for the benefit of striking workers).
347. See, e.g., Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583,
591 (1926) (striking down regulation of private motor carriers because it “is in
no real sense a regulation of the use of the public highways” but a disguised
protectionist measure subjecting competitors to the same rules that govern
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Throughout this period, the term “taking” was routinely
invoked as a casual synonym for a prohibited “deprivation” of
property without due process.348 But the substantive due process branch of “takings” law did not turn on judicial parsing of
“take” or “taking.” Instead, the analysis centered on the extent
of the claimant’s legitimate property entitlements in light of
the state’s reserved power to regulate. To delineate that boundary required careful, case-by-case scrutiny of the nature of, and
justification for, the governmental action, and whether that action was fairly embraced within the police power.
The spotlight thus shone directly on questions of central
importance in property law: how are we to understand the nature and limits of property rights in this case and in general,
and what are the nature and proper limits of the state’s power
to alter and amend property rights over time in response to important and changing social needs? Substantive due process
courts confronted these questions squarely and candidly. This
is in marked contrast to today’s regulatory takings jurisprudence, which answers the same questions obliquely through occasional delphic utterances on the deep interior meaning of “to
take” and “taking,” ahistorical forays into alleged “background”
principles of general common law, or metaphysical pronouncements on the essential attributes of “property.” Direct attention
to the central issues in property regulation within a framework
that expressly acknowledged and accommodated the need for
dynamic change in the law of property as a vital social institution in a complex and ever-changing world should be regarded
a singular virtue of substantive due process-era property jurisprudence.
But there was also a darker side. Because terms like “arbitrary” and “unreasonable” are indefinite and malleable, they
are susceptible to inconsistent application, manipulation, and
conscious or unconscious interposition of the policy preferences
of the reviewing court. Placing broad discretionary power in reviewing courts, substantive due process review led to the
abuses of the Lochner era, not least the tendency of courts to
second-guess the political branches on basic questions of social
policy. Lochner-ization led to the New Deal reaction repudiating substantive due process as the occasion for searching re-

common carriers).
348. See supra note 27.
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view of economic and social regulation.349
The New Deal reaction, however, only compounded the police power’s difficulties. As both cause and consequence of the
courts’ extreme deference to legislative enactments, the concept
of the “general welfare” swelled to include almost any legislative finding of a “public interest,” whether or not the benefit
was confined to a particular class.350 With unchecked expansion
of one of its core components, the police power became increasingly bloated and lost its analytical bite. Inflation of the police
power would reach its apex in Berman v. Parker,351 an influential 1954 Supreme Court case in which that quintessential New
Dealer, Justice William O. Douglas, pronounced the police
power virtually without limits.352
Ironically, Berman need not have been a police power case
at all; its utterances on that subject were unnecessary to the
outcome of the case. The question in Berman was whether an
urban renewal scheme to condemn and redevelop a blighted
area of the District of Columbia embraced a valid “public use”
satisfying the Takings Clause.353 Justice Douglas’s opinion began by equating the “public use” requirement with the police
power,354 obliterating the traditional understanding of the po349. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (upholding a Washington statute setting a minimum wage for women over the
dissent of four Justices who argued that the legislation arbitrarily interfered
with the liberty of contract in violation of substantive due process); Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (upholding a New York statute setting
minimum prices for milk, stating that “[i]f the laws passed are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary
nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied”); see also
Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536–37
(1949) (construing Nebbia and West Coast Hotel as repudiations of Lochner,
and stating that “the due process clause is no longer to be so broadly construed
that the Congress and state legislatures are put in a straight jacket when they
attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions which they regard as
offensive to the public welfare”).
350. See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424–25
(1952) (upholding a statute entitling employees to four hours of paid release
time on election day, reasoning that “the public welfare is a broad and inclusive concept,” and that the legislature might reasonably decide to protect the
community’s interest and encourage voting by shifting costs to employers).
351. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
352. See id. at 32 (defining the outer limits of the police power as “essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of
government” and “when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has
been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive”).
353. Id. at 28–31.
354. Id. at 32 (stating that the principle that the legislature and not the
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lice and eminent domain powers as complementary rather than
coextensive categories—a valid police power measure being not
compensable, and an eminent domain exercise not requiring a
police power justification.355 Berman then proceeded to recharacterize both the police power and “public use” in an unprecedentedly expansive way, stating that “[s]ubject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”356 In short, Berman held that the police power is pretty
much whatever the legislature deems to be in the public interest, because “the concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive,”357 “[t]he values it expresses are spiritual as well as
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary,”358 and “[i]t is within
the power of the legislature to determine that a community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.”359
With no apparent judicially enforceable limit to the “general welfare,” expansion of the police power was complete.
Without meaningful limits, the police power could no longer
serve a useful purpose in delineating the boundaries of legitimate governmental assertions of authority. The project of judicial policing of the bounds of the police power, long the knife
edge in the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence, was
a spent doctrinal force.
In a 1964 law review article that profoundly influenced
subsequent takings scholarship and doctrine, Joseph Sax argued that the police power defense in “takings” cases should be
eliminated because its indefinite contours left it vulnerable to

courts should determine the proper boundaries of the police power “admits of
no exception merely because the eminent domain power is involved” and that
“[t]he role of the judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one”).
355. The peculiar facts may have contributed to the confusion: Congress
had offered a police power-like justification for the urban renewal statute, labeling substandard housing and blighted areas “injurious to the public health,
safety, morals, and welfare,” id. at 28, and simultaneously declared acquisition
of property in these areas a “public use” justifying exercise of eminent domain.
Id. at 29. For a trenchant critique of Douglas’s reasoning, see Costonis, supra
note 179, at 1036–37 (“Taken literally the opinion makes little sense.”).
356. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
357. Id. at 33 (citing Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424
(1952))
358. Id.
359. Id.
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manipulation and inconsistent application.360 Sax’s critique is
powerfully argued and in many respects persuasive, and was
an important contribution to the late New Deal repudiation of
Lochner-ization and legal formalism.361
Sax’s account was also deeply ahistorical, however. He began by assuming a unified law of “takings,” attributing incorporation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to Chicago
B & Q,362 echoing the argument then being advanced by the
Supreme Court’s pro-incorporation wing. As Part III.B documented, however, the Takings Clause’s applicability to the
states was not yet the law of the land by the mid-1960s, and as
Part II showed it certainly was not part of the understanding of
late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century courts. Sax’s retrospective readings of substantive due process cases from this
era as a gloss on the meaning of the Takings Clause is therefore decidedly anachronistic.
Sax traced what he called the police power “exception” to
takings law to a series of conceptual distinctions drawn by Justice Harlan in Mugler v. Kansas363 and subsequent cases. On
Sax’s retelling, Harlan’s view was that if a challenged governmental action merely regulates the use of property, it is a noncompensable exercise of the police power; but if it results in
physical occupation or appropriation of a proprietary interest,
it is a compensable taking.364 In a later variant on Harlan’s
360. See Sax, supra note 198, passim.
361. See id. at 37 (stating that “Harlan’s theory reduces the constitutional
issue to a formalistic quibble” and has not “proved able to produce satisfactory
results”).
362. See id. at 36 n.2 (stating that the Takings Clause “has traditionally
been viewed as incorporated into the fourteenth amendment” (citing Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897))). An equally
provocative and influential article by Frank Michelman soon repeated Sax’s
error of conflating the substantive due process and Takings Clause branches of
just compensation law. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1168–70 (1967) (citing both substantive due process and
Takings Clause precedents to illustrate that takings doctrine is “liberally
salted with paradox”). Michelman’s article, however, was more theoretical,
less doctrinal, and less historical, disavowing any intention to “reformulate
doctrine, redirect it, or overhaul it,” instead urging “deemphasis of reliance on
judicial action as a method of dealing with the problem of compensation.” Id.
at 1167.
363. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
364. See Sax, supra note 198, at 38 (stating that Mugler held that a regulation of use “was not in any sense a ‘taking’ because it involved no appropriation of property for the public benefit but merely a limitation upon use by the
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theory, Sax said, takings analysis turned on the character of
the property owner’s activity: a regulation to abate a “noxious
use” was noncompensable, while regulatory interference with
“unoffending property” was compensable.365 Sax argued that
Harlan’s categorical approach reduced takings law to a “formalistic quibble,”366 but he conceded this approach remained more
or less workable so long as regulation had only a minor economic impact.367
By the early twentieth century, Sax said, the economic impact of regulation had grown dramatically, necessitating a doctrinal shift. Justice Holmes responded by introducing an economic calculus meant to ensure minimal fairness in the
inevitable battle between established property interests and
changing social demands.368 Sax read Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon and previous and subsequent Holmes opinions to reduce
takings law to a simple quantitative test based strictly on
diminution of economic value.369 Not only was this approach
atextual and ahistorical, Sax argued, but it failed to recognize
that expectations of economic gain or economic value do not
necessarily rise to the constitutionally protected status of property interests. Consequently, it is not obvious where we should
begin our calculation of diminution of value.370
owner for certain purposes declared to be injurious to the community,” a “theory Harlan apparently derived from the literal language of the fifth amendment, which deals only with the ‘taking’ of property (citing Mugler, 123 U.S.
623 (1887))). Sax’s account is wrong on several counts: Mugler was a Fourteenth Amendment due process case, made no mention of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, and pre-dated Chicago B & Q, when Sax says incorporation occurred. Mugler also acknowledged that some regulations of the “use” of
property would not pass constitutional muster. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661
(“It does not at all follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of these [police power] ends, is to be accepted as a legitimate exertion of
the police powers of the State. There are, of necessity, limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go.”).
365. See Sax, supra note 198, at 39 (“Harlan distinguished innocent from
noxious uses. . . . [He held that] abatement of a noxious use is not a taking of
property, since uses in contravention of the public interest are not property.”).
366. See id. at 37.
367. See id. at 39–40 (“Within a relatively narrow area Harlan’s conceptual
approach produces not only clear-cut distinctions, but also satisfactory results.”).
368. See id. at 40–41.
369. See id. at 41 (“While he never flatly stated that degree of economic
harm was the critical factor in his theory, a reading of his opinions leaves little
doubt that this was indeed the theory he devised.”).
370. See id. at 50–60 (criticizing the diminution of value theory and suggesting the need for a novel theory).
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Sax’s critique of the “diminution of value” test is devastating, and it applies with equal force to the many uses of that
standard in contemporary regulatory takings law.371 His historical account has several problems, however. First, Sax mistakenly characterizes the police power as a categorical “exception” to Fifth Amendment takings doctrine.372 This stands the
police power inquiry on its head. As Part II demonstrated,
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century courts understood the
police power to operate as an inherent limitation on staterecognized property rights; its doctrinal significance was not as
an “exception” to takings law, but rather as an aid to determining whether the claimant had a constitutionally protectible
property interest, a necessary antecedent to determining
whether property had been “taken.”373 The police power, in
other words, operated as a constitutive rule of the law of property whose function in Fourteenth Amendment adjudication
was to address the very question Sax says is missing from the
equation: does the claimant have a constitutionally protectible
property entitlement, or not?
Second, Sax’s account does justice neither to Harlan’s nor
to Holmes’s version of the police power inquiry, which were
subtler and more nuanced than Sax allows. The Harlan-era approach was conceptual and categorical, but the categories were
far more numerous and richer than those Sax describes. Substantive due process courts continually probed and teased out
the implications not only of “nuisance,” “noxious use,” and
“regulation,” but also the critical subunits that made up the police power: “public health,” “safety,” “morals,” and “general welfare.”374 Sax wholly ignores the rich debate over how to distinguish the “general welfare” from “class legislation,” and he is
similarly inattentive to the courts’ insistence on weeding out
“arbitrary” and “unreasonable” property regulations that did

371. See supra part III.C.
372. See Sax, supra note 198, at 37, 39 (arguing that “Harlan’s theory reduces the constitutional issue to a formalistic quibble”and “distinguish[es] takings from exercises of the police power by artful definition of the terms ‘taking’
and ‘property’”).
373. See supra Parts II.A and II.D.
374. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (stating that “[i]f . . . a
statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects,” it will be deemed invalid as an invasion of constitutionally protected
rights).
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not substantially advance a legitimate police power objective.375
To be sure, these debates were formalistic, and the categories
indeterminate. But within those limitations, they were real debates over central issues in property law, going to the nature
and limits of private property rights in a democratic polity and
the legitimacy and limits of public-regarding legislation, with
which courts of the substantive due process era grappled
thoughtfully and intelligently.
Holmes introduced new subtleties and refinements, moving
the discussion beyond formal categorization to recognize that
quantitative values might also play a role.376 Holmes thought
some quantum of “public interest” could be found even in redistributive laws that might previously have been held impermissible “class legislation,” and that the weight of the public interest served ought to count in determining whether a regulation
passes constitutional muster.377 Holmes introduced the notion
that it was not the mere fact that a private party had incurred
a loss, but the weight of that loss measured against the public
interest served by the regulation that should count toward its
reasonableness.378
At the end of the day, however, Sax was right. Substantive
due process and the police power, hatched in the days of nineteenth-century formalism, had trouble adapting. Holmes’s doctrinal innovations could not salvage these concepts which became more indeterminate than ever on his sliding-scale
calculus, consequently subject to as much Lochner-like manipulation as Harlan’s formal categories.379
375. See supra notes 339–41 and accompanying text.
376. See William Michael Treanor, Understanding Mahon in Historical
Context, 86 GEO. L.J. 933, 933–34 (1998) (arguing that in Mahon and other
cases Holmes was “breaking from the traditional categorical rules used by the
Court” and developing a “balancing test in which diminution in value was the
factor on the property owner’s side of the balance”).
377. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) (“Housing is a necessary of life. All the elements of a public interest justifying some degree of public control are present.”).
378. See supra notes 210–17 and accompanying text (describing Holmes’s
balancing test).
379. Holmes is justly famous for his dissents in Lochner and other substantive due process cases turning on the scope of “liberty,” but his views on the
“property” branch of due process were within the Lochner-era mainstream.
Reversals of economic and social regulation increased sharply during Holmes’s
tenure on the Court. See Brown, supra note 179, at 944 (stating that the Court
reversed more social and economic legislation between 1920 and 1927 than in
the previous 52 years). Holmes joined nine of the twelve reversals during this
period decided primarily on property grounds. See Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,
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Indeterminacy would lead to the near-total collapse of
meaningful judicial review of police power claims in the deferential post-New Deal, post-Berman era. Once the pendulum
swung that far, perhaps it was inevitable that Penn Central
would arise to bring it back, albeit now disguised in the borrowed doctrinal garb of a Takings Clause previously thought
inapplicable to the states.
By simply abandoning the police power defense and substantive due process review as a separate category of takings
law, however, we have also lost something. We have lost the
notion, central to substantive due process-era police power jurisprudence, that any regulatory “takings” inquiry must logically begin with a baseline assessment of the nature, extent,
and limits of the constitutionally protectible property rights
that the claimant is legitimately entitled to assert. We have
lost sight of the idea that such an inquiry must be informed
first and foremost by the applicable law of property—state law
in the main, and variable by jurisdiction. We have lost sight of
the notion that the state law of property might include, if the
state so asserts, the “background principle” that all property is
held subject to an inherent limitation consisting of the state’s
ongoing power to regulate for the public good. And we have lost
sight of the notion, so clearly understood by substantive due
process-era courts, that if a system of private property within a
democratic polity is to have ongoing vitality, this reserved regulatory power cannot be wholly without limits, yet it must also
be sufficiently flexible and dynamic to evolve over time,
through an ongoing dialogue among courts, legislatures, private rights-holders, and the public at large.
Lacking these concepts, contemporary regulatory takings
jurisprudence has lost its way.

271 U.S. 500 (1926); Mich. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925);
Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon 260
U.S. 393 (1922); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Chi., Milwaukee &
St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165 (1914); Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S.
137 (1912); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U.S.
354 (1912); Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904). Holmes wrote
the majority opinions in three of these cases (Polt, Chastleton, and Mahon),
and dissented in only three others. See Tyson & Bros.-United Theatre Ticket
Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445–47 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Frost
& Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm‘n, 271 U.S. 583, 600–02 (1926) (Holmes,
J., dissenting); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342–44 (1921) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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V. REHISTORICIZING JUST COMPENSATION LAW
It is too late in the day to question the applicability of the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to the states. After Penn
Central, that is established constitutional doctrine, unlikely
ever to be reversed. Nor is such a reversal normatively desirable; stare decisis and consistency with the overall thrust of selective incorporation, which has now “selectively” made most of
the guarantees of the original Bill of Rights applicable to the
states, counsel otherwise.380
It is not too late, however, to come to grips with the fact
that incorporation of the Takings Clause against the states is a
latter-day development whose appearance coincides precisely
with the emergence of the Supreme Court’s modern regulatory
takings jurisprudence in all its muddled grandeur. It is not too
late to recognize that much of the confusion stems from phantom incorporation, emerging full-grown from Penn Central
without benefit of the normal gestation of briefing, informed
argument, and adjudication in the courts below, which might
have produced a more thoughtful synthesis of the merged doctrines and careful consideration of the implications of incorporation.
Where, then, do we go from here? At the outset this Article
disclaimed any ambition to provide a comprehensive resolution
to the takings muddle. Its principal contribution is to diagnose
the malady, not to prescribe a cure—that is a future project.
The remainder of the Article will only begin to sketch out some
tentative directions that further inquiry might take.
First, the history of just compensation law suggests that
state lawmakers—legislatures as well as courts—traditionally
enjoyed broad latitude to define, interpret, and adjust the
boundaries of property law in response to changing conditions,
social needs, and evolving understandings of the appropriate
role of property as a social institution. Nothing in the text, history, or pre-Penn Central doctrine of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause requires that state lawmakers be deprived of that
power. Nor is the post-Penn Central trend toward increasingly
rigid and straightjacketing interpretations of the Takings
Clause consistent with fundamental tenets of federalism in
380. See Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403, 423 (2004) (stating that the Supreme Court “spent several
decades in the mid-Twentieth Century gradually incorporating most of the
relevant Bill of Rights provisions”).
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property law. Nor, finally, is such a straightjacketing advisable
on policy grounds if property is to continue to adapt and thrive
as a dynamic social institution. From that perspective, the last
three decades of Takings Clause jurisprudence represent a
great historical aberration, one that must be corrected by doctrinal adjustments that restore substantial discretion to state
lawmakers.
This is not to say, however, that state revisions to property
law should enjoy blanket immunity from federal judicial scrutiny. Giving state judges and legislators carte blanche to rewrite the rules of property free from federal judicial oversight is
an open invitation to abuse. Prior to the Reconstruction era
amendments, any such abuse perpetrated by the states was no
concern of federal law; prevailing doctrine held that the people
themselves had power to correct the abuses of their own state
governments through ordinary political means.381 But the Civil
War and the Reconstruction amendments forever changed the
relation of federal to state power, and with it, the nature of
“Our Federalism.”382
From shortly after the Civil War until Penn Central, federal courts found in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause all the means they needed to provide a meaningful
check on excessive, unfair, or unscrupulous exercises of state
power to readjust property law, reviewing claims that some
state measures “went too far” and fell outside the legitimate
bounds of the police power.383 That line was uncertain and
shifted over time. Courts declined even to try to articulate a
fixed standard for what counted as “too far.” On the whole they
exhibited considerably more deference toward the states even
at the height of the Lochner era than has the post-Penn Central
Court under its turbocharged, incorporated, and restrictive takings doctrine, but they did not hesitate to overturn state legislative enactments that appeared to reflect abuse or excess.
381. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249–50 (1833) (opining
that if the people had “required additional safeguards to liberty from the apprehended encroachments of their particular [state] governments: the remedy
was in their own hands,” but they directed the Bill of Rights “against the apprehended encroachments of the general government”).
382. See Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion,
110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 480 n.12 (1962) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment “intended a radical change in our federalism by subjecting to the control
of the Federal Constitution and of a federal congress and judiciary large areas
of state action and responsibility”).
383. See supra Part II.D.
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One way to set takings doctrine back on a sounder course,
then, might be to revive substantive due process as the appropriate doctrinal category for review of state adjustments to
property law. That approach is unlikely, however, and probably
unwise. The language and categories of substantive due process
and the police power now seem hopelessly antiquated, and the
concepts excessively malleable and subject to judicial abuse. At
first blush, this might seem to invite a return to the worst excesses of the Lochner era. The Court’s post-Penn Central takings jurisprudence has been widely criticized on grounds that it
bears a disturbingly close resemblance to Lochner-era substantive due process review, albeit dressed in new doctrinal garb
that disguises its true character.384 While an explicit return to
substantive due process would at least bring some candor and
transparency to this development, such a move might tend to
entrench and re-legitimate a takings law that has gone seriously awry by refurbishing it with a new, rehistoricized doctrinal pedigree.
But substantive due process and the police power have also
undergone a metamorphosis since their Lochner-era heyday.
After Nebbia,385 West Coast Hotel,386 and Carolene Products,387
the Court’s standard approach to substantive due process review of economic regulation is the highly deferential “rational
basis” test: if the enactment is rationally related to any legitimate public purpose the Court can imagine, it passes constitutional muster.388 Additionally, as Part IV pointed out, since
Berman v. Parker the police power has grown so broad as to be
almost meaningless: any objective deemed by the legislature to
be “in the public interest” is a legitimate police power justification. Under these highly deferential standards, a return to substantive due process is less likely to lead to re-Lochner-ization

384. See, e.g., Echeverria & Dennis, supra note 1, at 699 (characterizing
takings doctrine as “importing due process thinking into the takings issue”).
385. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
386. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
387. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The Court
stated that in a facial due process challenge “where the legislative judgment is
drawn in question, [the inquiry] must be restricted to the issue whether any
state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it.” Id. at 154.
388. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (speculating on possible legislative purposes and concluding that because “[w]e cannot say that the regulation has no rational relation to that objective [it cannot
be ruled] beyond constitutional bounds”).
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than to a threadbare doctrine affording little opportunity for
meaningful judicial review.
But if rational basis review is too deferential and Lochnerstyle substantive due process—whether forthrightly so labeled,
or disguised as Takings Clause doctrine—is too stringent,
where is the middle ground?
The famous Carolene Products Footnote Four389 provides a
clue. Carolene Products drew two important distinctions: first,
there “may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to
be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution”; and second, “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” who are
insufficiently protected by ordinary political processes “may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”390
The first Carolene Products distinction offers little help. Although protection of property under the due process and takings guarantees is a robust constitutional norm arguably calling for a less deferential standard of review than the ordinary
“rational basis” test, it would be deeply ahistorical and doctrinally problematic to deem every adjustment to property law
presumptively unconstitutional, even as the starting point in
the analysis.
The second Carolene Products distinction is more promising, for it goes to the heart of what has historically motivated
takings law.
Rhetorically defending the necessity of a vital takings jurisprudence, the Supreme Court regularly invokes Armstrong v.
United States, which stated that takings law seeks to prevent
government from “forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.”391 This concern about the “singling out” of
some property owners for exceptionally harsh treatment has
strong normative resonance. The animating force behind the
389. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
390. Id.
391. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Scarcely a major
Takings Clause case has been decided in the post-Penn Central era without
citation to Armstrong. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074,
2080 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 304 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001)
(O’Connor, J., concurring); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994);
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071 (1992); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 n.4 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
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Takings Clause itself was the antifederalist fear that a distant
national government would be tempted to “single out” some local property owners to bear unfair and unreasonable burdens
which would be of little concern to national majorities.392 The
“singling out” principle has found echoes throughout the history of takings doctrine.393 It is also, at a deep level, the principle that animated the substantive due process era’s concern
with the legitimate bounds of the police power, which although
malleable could extend neither to “arbitrary and unreasonable”
deprivations of property, nor to “taking from A to give to B.”
More recently, such thoughtful scholars as William Fischel,
Saul Levmore, Susan Rose-Ackerman, and Dan Farber have
advanced their own formulations of the “singling out” issue as
the central problem of takings law.394 Despite the Court’s recurrent invocation of Armstrong as rhetorical backdrop, however, that principle is not adequately reflected at an operational level in contemporary takings doctrine. None of the
major takings tests—Penn Central, Loretto, Lucas, Nollan, or
Dolan—squarely addresses the comparative question of how
this owner (or class of owners) is treated relative to others similarly situated, the quintessential “singling out” inquiry. 395
392. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
393. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325
(1893) (stating that takings law “prevents the public from loading upon one
individual more than his just share of the burdens of government, and says
that when he surrenders to the public something more and different from that
which is exacted from other members of the public, a full and just equivalent
shall be returned to him”).
394. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS,
AND POLITICS 6 (1995) (describing takings law as “the product of democratic
constitution-making in which citizens wanted to promote development without
unfairly distributing its burdens”); Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just
Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 307–08 (1992) (advancing a “uniformity theory” of takings law as prophylaxis against discrimination, recognizing
that the politically disadvantaged need the protection of a formal rule); Saul
Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 306–07
(1990) (arguing that the Takings Clause protects “occasional individuals” because it is “unlikely that such individuals can compete effectively in the political arena”); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on
Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1708 (1988) (“[T]he problem for takings
jurisprudence is to decide when an individual has borne more than his or her
‘just share of the burdens of government.’”).
395. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1892, 1927 (1992) (stating that the Court “has
not . . . used this articulated purpose to identify the takings factors,” and current doctrine “does not prevent the government from unfairly ‘forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens’”); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings
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The Armstrong “singling out” problem can be understood
as an instance of the Carolene Products “discrete and insular
minorities” caveat. Both Carolene Products and Armstrong focus on defects in the political process, in particular the non-selfcorrecting problems of political majorities trampling on minority rights.396 While Carolene Products contemplated that readily identifiable racial, ethnic, or religious minorities would be
most vulnerable,397 the problem of majoritarian excess extends
well beyond those groups. In the property context, unreasonable impositions on a majority of property owners are likely to
generate strong political backlash, and stand a fair chance of
being corrected through ordinary political means. But when
majorities indulge the temptation to place special burdens on
minorities of property owners—for example, nonresident (and
nonvoting) property owners in a local municipality—ordinary
political processes offer little meaningful recourse. It is as a
safeguard against that sort of abuse that a judicially administered constitutional takings law, operating as a check on ordinary legislation, can play a legitimate and constructive role. A
Carolene Products-like heightened scrutiny in cases that involve the “singling out” of some identifiable class of property
owners owing to defects in the political process offers a promising middle ground between a too-stringent re-Lochner-ization
on the one hand, and an excessively deferential “rational basis”
standard on the other.
At the end of the day, however, a revival of substantive due
process in any form as the basis for review of takings claims
against the states appears unlikely. Nor is it necessary, for it
may be possible to rehabilitate Takings Clause doctrine directly, following the broad outlines just suggested.
First, the Court must recognize that every takings case
necessarily turns on the question: “Has a taking of property occurred in this case?” To answer that question, the Court must
Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part II—Takings as Intentional
Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CAL. L. REV. 53, 56
(1990) (stating that despite rhetorical appeals to Armstrong, “the Court has
made little effort to develop a principled basis for determining when fairness
requires the payment of compensation”).
396. Cf. FISCHEL, supra note 394, at 206–07 (arguing that government does
not always consider aggregate social welfare in allocating the costs of governmental decisions, and may force disproportionate costs onto some property
owners for others’ benefit).
397. See 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (listing “religious” and “racial minorities” as especially vulnerable).
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advert to the relevant law of property—principally state law—
to determine the legitimate extent of claimants’ property
rights, and in particular, what (if any) limits to those rights
“inhere in the title” as a matter of state law. Not only must the
Court begin to take the law of property seriously in its Takings
Clause jurisprudence, but it must also take seriously the principle articulated in Lucas, that an exercise of state lawmaking
authority expressing a “limitation that “inhere[s] in the title” as
a matter of “background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance” can never count as a regulatory “taking,” for
the simple reason that such action takes no property.398
Next, the Court must take seriously the history of our law
of property. History teaches that states have always claimed, as
a “background principle of the state’s law of property,” the reserved police power to alter the law of property at the margins
for purposes of protecting the public health, safety, morals, and
general welfare; and further that under their law of property,
all property is always held subject to this inherent limitation.399
That does not mean, however, that states have free rein to
alter property rules as they will, without restraint. For here the
Court can usefully interject, and for once take seriously, the
Armstrong principle. If the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
does apply to the states, then it must be interpreted to stand as
a safeguard against just the kinds of abuses of governmental
power that led to its being appended to the Constitution in the
first place—defects in the political process that lead to the arbitrary “singling out” of individuals or “discrete and insular”
classes of property owners for harsher treatment than the rest,
whether to benefit other identifiable individuals or classes, or
to benefit of the public generally. The question then becomes
not simply how much is “taken” from the claimant as measured
against ex ante expectations of market value; for mere expectations, without more, are not “property” under anyone’s law. The
question is, has the state abused its claimed police power by
arbitrarily imposing burdens on the few that ought legitimately
be borne by the many, owing to defects in the political process?
This four-part readjustment of Takings Clause doctrine—
in which the Court takes seriously what counts as “property,”
what counts as an “inherent limitation,” the legitimacy of
states’ historic claim to an inherent and dynamic police power
398. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028–29 (1992).
399. See supra Part II.

KARKKAINEN_3FMT

2006]

04/20/2006 10:15:59 AM

THE POLICE POWER REVISITED

913

limitation on property rights, and a robust and operational version of the Armstrong “singling out” principle as a judicial
check on arbitrary exercises of state authority—could begin to
chart the path out of the takings muddle.
CONCLUSION
For all its faults, Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process review in “takings” cases had some singular virtues.
This jurisprudence kept its eye trained squarely on the principle that all property, everywhere, is always and inescapably
subject to the “inherent limitation” that followed from the
state’s reserved power to adjust the precise boundaries and
meaning of property rights over time in response to changing
conditions and altered social understandings. The appropriate
extent of that inherent limitation on property rights, and the
corresponding outer constitutional limits to the state’s reserved
power, were the subject of continuous dialogue among the
courts, the legislatures, and private property claimants. That
dialogue was shrouded in the language and categorical distinctions of the police power, concepts that sound quaint to the contemporary ear. Although these concepts grew unsustainably
leaky over time, at least they provided some underlying coherency to the Court’s just compensation jurisprudence, founded
on principles of property federalism and recognition that property is necessarily a dynamic institution that must respond and
adapt to changing times. As Justice Sutherland eloquently put
it in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, upholding the thennovel regulatory technique of land use zoning:
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied
to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly
sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would
have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are
sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons
analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which, before the
advent of automobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have
been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this
there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional
guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or
contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing
world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise.400

May we be so wise as to rediscover that principle in the
takings doctrine of the coming century.
400. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).

